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INSURING TAKINGS CLAIMS 
Christopher Serkin 
ABSTRACT—Local governments typically insure themselves against all 
kinds of losses, from property damage to legal liability. For small- and 
medium-sized governments, this usually means purchasing insurance from 
private insurers or participating in municipal risk pools. Insurance for 
regulatory takings claims, however, is generally unavailable. This 
previously unnoticed gap in municipal insurance coverage could lead risk 
averse local governments to underregulate and underenforce existing 
regulations where property owners threaten to bring takings claims. This 
seemingly technical observation turns out to have profound implications for 
theoretical accounts of the Takings Clause that focus on government 
regulatory incentives. This Article explores the impact of insurance on land 
use regulations. In the process, it reveals important insights about public 
insurance more generally and offers a novel explanation for the burgeoning 
land use innovation in cities compared to the relative stagnation of land use 
in the suburbs. It concludes by suggesting new ways for promoting local 
land use regulations that risk generating takings claims. 
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Local governments face many different risks of financial loss, whether 
from flooding, workers’ compensation, embezzlement, property damage, or 
litigation, to name just a few. Litigation imposes a particularly broad set of 
risks. For example, victims of civil rights violations can sue under § 1983;1 
people injured on public property, whether a playground or a street, might 
sue in tort;2 municipal employees can sue for discriminatory employment 
practices;3 and property owners burdened by land use regulations might sue 
under the Takings Clause.4 All of these risks expose local governments to 
the possibility of financial losses. But there is an unexpected difference 
between them. Civil rights violations, torts, contract claims, property 
damage, and so forth are almost always covered to a greater or lesser extent 
by municipal insurance.5 Regulatory takings claims, however, are not.6 
Although previously unnoticed in the legal literature, insurance is by and 
large not available for regulatory takings litigation.7 Why is that? And, 
 
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (creating private right of action for constitutional violations). 
2 See, e.g., Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. City of Chicago, 807 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) 
(rejecting City’s claim of immunity when fence gate surrounding public library fell on plaintiff’s leg). 
3 See, e.g., Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 512, 526 (D.N.J. 2000) (involving claim 
by police officer that he was discharged because of his race). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex. 
1998) (involving claims by property owners for violations of Takings Clause when town refused to 
rezone their property to permit dense development). 
5 See infra Section I.A. 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See discussions infra Section II.A. 
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more pressingly, does the absence of this municipal insurance make risk 
averse local governments reluctant to enact (or defend and enforce) socially 
beneficial regulations? 
Answering these questions requires understanding the nature of 
regulatory takings risk and also the almost unexplored warrens of 
municipal risk management.8 The paucity of recent legal scholarship in the 
area is hardly surprising.9 Examining how municipalities deal with risk 
requires understanding technical aspects of insurance law and insurance 
markets, the political dynamics in local governments, and the nature and 
effects of municipal risk aversion. These are all topics that threaten to make 
eyes glaze and heads go woolly. But they turn out to be vitally important 
and in fact are crucial to understanding the operation of land use 
regulations on the ground. 
If there is any doubt, protracted litigation in Half Moon Bay, 
California, should put it to rest. In 2007, property owners brought a 
successful regulatory takings claim against that municipality of 12,000 
people and won a judgment of over $36 million.10 Crippled, the town 
eliminated its police and recreation services and then considered dissolving 
as an independent jurisdiction.11 The municipality was saved, however, 
when it successfully sued a former insurer for coverage under an 
“occurrence-based” policy that had lapsed more than twenty years earlier.12 
 
8 Public risk management is occasionally discussed in other fields, such as political science. See, 
e.g., Yuhua Qiao, Public Risk Management: Development and Financing, 19 J. PUB. BUDGETING, 
ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 33 (2007). 
9 For one recent and impressive exception that explores the impact of public insurance on police 
conduct, see John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733783&download=yes 
[https://perma.cc/QTB4-RZFH]. 
10 Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (ordering 
damages of $36,795,000). Plaintiffs brought an inverse condemnation claim, which is the primary form 
of bringing a regulatory takings claim against a state. For discussion of “inverse condemnation,” see 
infra text accompanying note 162. 
11 John Coté, Half Moon Bay Grapples with $36.8 Million Judgment Against It, SFGATE (Dec. 18, 
2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Half-Moon-Bay-grapples-with-36-8-million-
3234399.php [https://perma.cc/L2DM-XM7V]. As one County Supervisor put it: 
One of the options, candidly, is . . . to dissolve . . . . That’s an extreme. But when you get a 
judgment of $36 million plus legal fees . . . even if you were able to finance it and stretch it out 
over a period of time, you would need significant reductions in your level of service to pay that 
off.  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
12 See Aaron Kinney, Half Moon Bay: City Wins $10 Million in Arbitration, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_21603337/half-moon-bay-city-
wins-10-million-arbitration [perma.cc/X3MA-UUQQ]; see also Mark Noak, City Seeks Payback for 
Beachwood Loss, HALF MOON BAY REV. (May 10, 2012), http://www.hmbreview.com/news/city-
seeks-payback-for-beachwood-loss/article_4ab2f7e4-9acb-11e1-b7a5-0019bb2963f4.htm?mode=print 
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It was an unusual victory for a local government based on an extremely 
unusual set of facts; in most cases, as surveyed below, the insurance 
company wins, and such regulatory takings are excluded from coverage.13 
But the overall point is easy to see: the very survival of Half Moon Bay 
depended on its insurance coverage for regulatory takings. 
Municipal insurance implicates broader conceptual issues as well. 
Much of the important contemporary writing on land use and property 
regulation focuses on competing accounts of local government 
decisionmaking. Scholars have argued for years about the effects of 
compensation on governments’ regulatory incentives. Professor Richard 
Epstein, for example, has argued that compensation is necessary to force 
local officials to internalize the costs of their actions and thereby to induce 
efficient regulatory incentives.14 Public choice theorists, in contrast, have 
argued that governments do not internalize costs and benefits in this way, 
but are focused instead on maximizing their political capital.15 But neither 
of these sophisticated treatments has discussed the impact of insurance on 
government decisionmaking. Any account of local officials’ economic or 
political incentives surrounding environmental and land use regulation 
must contend with insurance, and yet no one to date has studied its impact 
on local officials. 
Regulatory takings liability can be disastrous for a municipality, as the 
story of Half Moon Bay vividly demonstrates.16 Just the litigation costs 
alone of defending land use regulations can be exorbitant.17 But the most 
damaging effect may be on the ex ante incentives of local governments to 
avoid regulations that might trigger litigation, however frivolous the 
claims. In the absence of insurance, a risk averse government may choose 
not to enact beneficial land use regulations—or not to enforce existing 
 
[perma.cc/6RFE-UQSB] (describing effort to pursue lapsed insurance policy); Press Release, City of 
Half Moon Bay, Half Moon Bay Mayor Announces Significant Legal Victory in Yamagiwa Insurance 
Claim (2012) [perma.cc/8976-PU9T] (describing details of award). For discussion on the difference 
between claims-made and occurrence-based policies, see infra text accompanying notes 90–93. 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 84–85 (1993); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73–74 (8th ed. 2011); Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The 
State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 361–62 (2014) (describing this 
conventional economic account). 
15 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic 
Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, 
and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). 
16 See supra text accompanying notes 10–12 (describing saga of Half Moon Bay). 
17 One indication of this—albeit indirect—is that up to 41% of insurance costs are “attributable to 
defense costs.” Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty to Defend, 58 MD. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1999). 
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regulations—that create a risk of litigation, even if the likelihood of 
liability is remote, and even if the expected value of the regulation is 
strongly positive. And the more risk averse the government, the more 
cautious it will be in its regulatory enactments and enforcement decisions. 
The absence of insurance for regulatory takings claims—both for the 
risk that a land use regulation is ultimately judged to be a taking, and also 
for the litigation costs regardless of outcome—is therefore likely to have 
unexpected and previously unnoticed distributional effects as between local 
governments. For larger cities that almost entirely self-insure against 
liability of all kinds, the absence of takings insurance will have little if any 
ex ante effect. Cities with large tax bases will be risk neutral in their 
regulatory incentives.18 Government decisionmakers in urban settings can, 
by and large, determine the expected value of regulatory decisions 
rationally and will not overweight the risk of liability (subject to dynamic 
political pressures, considered below). But the same is not likely to be true 
of smaller governments with fewer residents and a less diverse tax base. 
For those governments, the costs of takings litigation may be crippling, so 
decisionmakers will be averse to litigation risks.19 
It may well be that this difference in relative risk aversion around land 
use regulations accounts for some of the dynamism in cities today and also 
for the relative stagnation of suburbs and exurbs.20 Because of their relative 
risk aversion, smaller local governments are less likely to be regulatory 
innovators and will seek instead to avoid enacting regulations that might 
generate regulatory takings claims. Larger cities, on the other hand, will be 
freer to push the regulatory envelope. This is not to suggest that holes in 
municipal liability insurance provide a complete or even predominant 
explanation for the recent rebirth of America’s urban core, but municipal 
risk management does play an unexpected role in reinforcing those 
dynamics.21 
Because of the financial risks of takings litigation, and the resulting 
distributional consequences, it is important to explore potential 
mechanisms for allowing smaller local governments to offload at least 
some of the risk of takings and land use litigation more broadly. Having 
 
18 See infra Section I.A. 
19 For an earlier suggestion that risk aversion of municipalities tracks their size, see Christopher 
Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1624, 1668 (2006) (“Government risk aversion therefore correlates more to the size than to the 
wealth of the tax base, and it is inversely related to the number of taxpayers over whom the risk is 
spread.”). 
20 See infra Section II.C. 
21 See, e.g., EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY (2011) (identifying rebirth of American 
cities). 
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identified a gap in coverage, there may be public or private insurance 
products that could step in to fill it. But this Article ultimately argues that 
the most appropriate and most likely solution comes from the state. Indeed, 
state intervention—through discretionary indemnification or the promise of 
direct legal representation—may prove a more effective and targeted 
subsidy for local land use regulation than anything currently in states’ 
arsenals. 
This is not an invitation for local governments to ride roughshod over 
property rights. The problem for local governments is that every land use 
regulation comes with some risk of takings litigation and potential liability. 
Even if local officials are trying to regulate well within the bounds of what 
the Constitution permits, they still may be sued and may even lose because 
the regulatory takings standard is notoriously difficult to apply. Existing 
insurance mechanisms can help prevent indemnifying local governments 
for willful violations of the Takings Clause. Like most insurance, then, the 
goal is to design a product that will allow local officials to value the risk of 
takings claims rationally. This means neither being too cautious nor 
ignoring the risks altogether. 
The topic of risk management and liability insurance for land use 
litigation is not a technocratic backwater of local government operations 
but is an untheorized and underexplored field that shapes local 
governments’ ability and willingness to regulate in the first place. Studying 
this topic yields unexpected benefits along the way, like a deeper 
understanding of governmental risk and the motivations of public officials 
on the ground. And it reveals how insurance can be a valuable form of state 
subsidy for local officials. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I examines the nature of 
municipal risk and the ways in which local governments manage risk. Part 
II demonstrates that risk-spreading devices are not generally available for 
regulatory takings claims. Part II also argues that the absence of regulatory 
takings insurance can distort municipal regulatory incentives. Part III 
finally explores some private market solutions, and then ultimately 
proposes that states should offer a system of discretionary indemnification 
to encourage beneficial land use regulations. 
I. THE NATURE OF INSURANCE AND MUNICIPAL RISK 
This Article’s fundamental observation is that the absence of 
insurance for regulatory takings litigation has potentially damaging effects 
on local governments’ regulatory incentives. But that claim requires, first, 
exploring why local governments have insurance for other kinds of risks 
and the ways in which municipalities manage risk more broadly. Indeed, 
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the oddity here may not be the absence of insurance for takings claims but 
the presence of municipal insurance at all. This Part examines the 
relationship between risk and insurance generally, the reasons why 
insurance is valuable to local governments in particular, and the tools 
employed to address municipal risk management. 
A. Municipal Risk and the Role of Insurance 
In order to understand why the absence of regulatory takings 
insurance is significant, it is first necessary to understand, in broad strokes, 
why municipalities would have insurance against any kind of risk. 
Insurance, after all, is valuable because of risk aversion, which is a product 
of the diminishing marginal utility of money.22 Risk aversion makes 
decisionmakers unwilling to take risks that have a positive expected value 
because of an aversion to the possible loss.23 It appears at its strongest when 
a potential loss represents a substantial portion of someone’s total (or, at 
least, liquid) wealth.24 For individuals, the intuition is straightforward. A 
$100,000 loss is likely to be more valuable (costly) than a $100,000 gain.25 
A $100,000 gain might allow you to buy a fancy car and pay down some 
student loans. But if you lose $100,000, you might have trouble buying 
food and paying rent. For most people, not being able to afford food and 
rent is a more harmful outcome than not being able to afford a fancy car. In 
short, people have a hierarchy of interests and are likely to be averse to 
risks that implicate more important ones.26 
For individuals, how much someone would be willing to pay to avoid 
a risk of loss depends on her relative risk aversion.27 A completely risk 
neutral person would not pay to avoid a bet with an expected value of zero, 
no matter how high the stakes. But a risk averse person might pay a great 
 
22 See, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 
113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1267 (2004) (“[E]conomists use the term ‘risk aversion’ in a much narrower sense 
than does the general public. To an economist, risk aversion means only that the marginal utility of 
wealth declines as wealth increases.”). 
23 KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90 (1971). 
24 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 258 (2004). 
25 Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law & Economics of Liability Insurance, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORT 169, app. at 194 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) (summarizing 
conventional model of risk aversion). 
26 Cf. A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 386 (1943) (positing 
human “hierarchy of basic needs”). 
27 See Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1265 (“Experience suggests that people differ in the extent to 
which they are averse to financial risks. Someone whose marginal utility of wealth falls off very rapidly 
as wealth increases is more risk-averse than someone whose marginal utility of wealth does not change 
much as she becomes wealthier.”). 
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deal.28 She will prefer a definite small loss to a chance of a large one with 
the same expected value. 
Why, then, would a local government official pay a premium to avoid 
some risk of loss? Insurance is valuable when it allows risk averse people 
or entities to transfer risk to less risk averse ones.29 But it is not obvious 
why governments and government actors would be risk averse in the first 
place. At least theoretically, a government always has the capacity to raise 
taxes. Therefore, a liability—no matter how large—cannot implicate the 
government’s ability to meet its higher priority expenses, such as schools 
or police, when it has limitless capacity to generate revenue. Indeed, most 
scholarly literature assumes that all governments are risk neutral.30 
This theoretical claim, however, does not hold up in the real world. A 
local government cannot simply tax its way out of its liabilities. Those 
costs are ultimately borne by taxpayers who do not have unlimited access 
to revenue. In the absence of insurance, then, local officials are likely to be 
risk averse for two interrelated reasons: the risk aversion of local taxpayers 
who ultimately fund uninsured liabilities, and politicians’ own political 
self-interest.31 Both require some unpacking. 
Consider taxpayers’ incentives first. To the extent local officials 
accurately represent their constituents’ preferences, the relevant inputs for 
governmental risk aversion are the risk preferences of local taxpayers.32 
Taxpayers ultimately finance most government liabilities, and at the local 
level, this usually means property taxes.33 For property owners, then, the 
absence of municipal insurance raises the possibility of a large loss to the 
government that will appear on their tax bills. Risk averse taxpayers will 
therefore value, and be willing to pay for, municipal insurance to offload 
 
28 Risk aversion is idiosyncratic to a certain extent. Some people are simply more risk averse, or 
more risk seeking, than others. In general, risk aversion is inversely correlated with wealth. See, e.g., 
Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 15, at 604 (“The general view held by economists is that absolute risk 
aversion declines with wealth.”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 127 (1992) (“[T]he wealthy should be less willing to insure against 
losses of the same size than the poor, since a smaller portion of their total wealth is at risk.”). 
29 Cf. Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1265 (“The insured pays a small amount in good times, 
reducing wealth slightly at a time when wealth is plentiful and the money spent on insurance is 
relatively painless.”). 
30 See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1666 nn.163–64 (citing sources indicating government neutrality). 
31 For earlier work introducing the possibility of governmental risk aversion, see id. 
32 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 15, at 616 (identifying that government officials may be risk 
averse if their constituents are risk averse); cf. Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the 
Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 370 (1970) (evaluating risk 
bearing by public entities and asserting that “a public investment can be considered an investment in 
which each individual taxpayer has a very small share.”). 
33 Serkin, supra note 19, at 1652–53 (discussing role of property taxes in financing local 
governments). 
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some or all of the risk of a spike in their property taxes. They will, for 
example, prefer paying an extra $50 per year in taxes rather than risk a 4% 
chance of a $1000 spike in any given year, even though the expected cost 
of the latter is only $40. 
Taxpayers’ risk aversion varies as a function of the municipality’s 
population and wealth. After all, it is the potential magnitude of taxpayers’ 
individual losses that will affect their aversion to risk. That, in turn, will 
depend on the per capita effect on property taxes, and not the total value of 
a municipal loss.34 Even a large judgment against a municipality does not 
necessarily translate into large per capita costs to local taxpayers. In effect, 
then, local governments spread risk through the number of taxpayers.35 
Furthermore, whether that per capita amount is salient will depend on 
individual taxpayers’ relative risk aversion. Combining these two insights 
means that the larger and wealthier the tax base, the less risk averse 
municipal officials should be, if they are accurately representing their 
constituents’ preferences. This model therefore predicts that local officials 
in smaller and poorer municipalities will, indeed, be quite averse to risks 
that may measurably impact property taxes, while officials in larger and 
wealthier municipalities should be closer to risk neutral.36 
Pause for a moment, though, and consider if this is necessarily true. 
After all, a municipality has an alternative mechanism for shielding 
taxpayers from unpredictable spikes in property taxes to fund municipal 
liabilities. Faced with a significant liability—whether a legal judgment or 
otherwise—a local government could float a bond to cover the cost.37 Debt 
will not eliminate nor even reduce the costs that the municipality might 
ultimately owe. Indeed, the costs of borrowing, reflected in the interest 
rates of municipal bonds, will mean that a municipality will end up paying 
 
34 Arrow & Lind, supra note 32, at 373 (“If the size of the share [of risk] borne by each taxpayer is 
a negligible component of his income, the cost of risk-bearing associated with holding it will be 
small . . . . This situation will exist where the investment [or risk] is small with respect to the total 
wealth of the taxpayers.”). 
35 See Arrow & Lind, supra note 32, at 366 (“[G]overnment distributes the risk associated with any 
investment among a large number of people.”); Serkin, supra note 19, at 1668 (“It is as if governments 
diversify their exposure to risk through the sheer number of their constituents.”). 
36 Cf. George A. Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities, 9 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 
363, 367 (1942) (proposing capping liability for municipalities smaller than 10,000 people because of 
their particular susceptibility to the problem of large adverse judgments). That is especially true because 
larger local governments can often raise revenue through other forms of taxation, like sales or income 
taxes. 
37 Managers of insurance pools—discussed infra Section I.B.3—use debt in precisely this way. See 
Amy V. Puelz & Robert Puelz, Managerial Use of Debt to Fund Municipal Government Risks, 
28 DECISION SCI. 745, 746 (1997) (“[A]mong [intergovernmental risk pools], the predominant 
alternative risk-financing strategy chosen by managers is the issuance of debt.”). 
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more in total when it funds liabilities through debt than when paying 
immediately. But selling bonds may well be less expensive than purchasing 
insurance ex ante, and they have largely the same effect. 
Just as insurance transforms the risk of spiky losses into more 
predictable but certain ex ante costs, debt does the same thing ex post. If 
taxpayers prefer—and will pay some premium for—avoiding 
unpredictability in tax rates, that can be accomplished simply by issuing 
debt as needed.38 Debt is, in a sense, a kind of ex post insurance 
mechanism, smoothing the impact of a sudden liability into predictable and 
smaller payments over time. This, now, is a more nuanced restatement of 
the question that opened this Section: Why would municipal insurance ever 
be valuable to a government that has other tools for controlling its own 
cash flow? 
Here, again, the theoretical argument that local governments are risk 
neutral loses traction in the real world. There are, in fact, important limits 
on a municipality’s ability to borrow its way out of a sudden liability. For 
one, state law often caps the amount of debt that a municipality can incur.39 
If a municipality is at or near its debt ceiling, it will not be able to spread 
the impact of a sudden liability into the future. For another, the due 
process, administrative, and political costs of incurring debt may be quite 
high. In many jurisdictions, issuing debt above a certain amount may 
trigger bond election requirements, requiring voters to approve the bonds.40 
There is another subtler dynamic at work as well. The interest rate a 
municipality will pay for municipal bonds depends upon the municipality’s 
bond rating. That rating, in turn, depends on a number of factors, including 
 
38 If an example is useful, imagine a government facing a legal claim with an expected value of $1 
million (perhaps a 25% chance of a $4 million loss). The government could fund that loss ex ante 
through insurance or ex post through debt. An insurance company might be willing to insure against 
that claim for $1,100,000 (converting the risk of a $4 million loss into a certain loss of only $1.1 
million, where the extra $100,000 represents the risk premium being divided between the insurer and 
the insured). The alternative for the municipality is to wait and fund any liability through debt. If the 
claim fails, the government will owe nothing. But if there is a $4 million judgment, the government 
could fund this through a ten-year bond at 2.5% (a typical product in today’s markets). This will end up 
costing the government approximately $525,000 in interest. The cost-benefit calculus then should be 
whether the $100,000 insurance premium is preferable to the expected value of the interest it would 
owe if forced to float a bond, here a 25% chance that it will have to pay $525,000 (or $131,250). Of 
course, the actual calculus is even more complex because the insurance premiums are paid today, 
whereas the interest on debt is paid in the future and so is subject to further discounting. 
39 See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local 
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 926 (2011) (discussing debt limits). However, there is reason to 
think that debt limits do not apply to raising money to satisfy regulatory takings claims. See F & L Farm 
Co. v. City Council, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 360, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
40 See Serkin, supra note 39, at 926–27 (describing bond election requirements). 
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the size of the tax base and outstanding liabilities.41 If a municipality waits 
until after an adverse judgment, that liability will affect its ability to borrow 
on favorable terms. Relatedly, another key factor in municipal bond ratings 
is the municipality’s risk management practices. Rating agencies will look 
at how municipalities deal with risk ex ante in assigning a bond rating.42 
For both of these reasons, a municipality that simply waits to issue debt 
until it is faced with large liabilities will end up paying much more than a 
municipality that has risk management strategies including insurance in 
place. In other words, credit markets will prevent governments from 
relying too heavily on ex post strategies for mitigating risk to taxpayers. 
Local officials that care about taxpayers’ risk preferences cannot simply 
rely on debt to smooth tax burdens over time. 
There is also more to the impact of a takings judgment than the 
possibility of a higher one-time tax bill. The threat to taxpayers of an 
adverse takings judgment may not be fully captured by the incremental 
increase in their property taxes. The more serious problem arises when a 
judgment or settlement creates a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
neighboring municipalities. Local governments, after all, are in competition 
with each other for mobile capital.43 The terms of the competition are taxes 
and services. Therefore, the absolute cost to a government may be less 
important than its impact relative to its neighbors. Even a small change in 
tax rates to fund litigation or an adverse legal judgment can have a big 
impact in the ability to attract the marginal business or affluent household. 
Qualitative empirical work supports the idea that local officials are in fact 
very sensitive and averse to risks that will create such a relative 
disadvantage.44 The one million dollars spent on takings litigation is, for 
 
41 See, e.g., MOODY’S INV’R SERV., RATING METHODOLOGY: US LOCAL GOVERNMENT GENERAL 
OBLIGATION DEBT 3 (2014) (on file with author) (providing overview “scorecard” for bond rating). 
42 See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, ABOUT CREDIT RATINGS (2012) (on file with author) (“In rating 
an issuer, such as a corporation or municipality, analysts conduct a review of the financial performance, 
policies, and risk management strategies of that issuer as well as of the business and economic 
environment in which the issuer operates.”); cf. TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING 
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 64–
65 (2010) (describing increased borrowing costs for corporations without insurance). 
43 See Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property 
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957, 
959 (1969); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 420 
(1956); see also David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the 
Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261, 265 (2005) (citing PAUL PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981)) (identifying cities’ 
singular interest in pursuing economic development to compete with other municipalities); Richard C. 
Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
482, 484 (2009) (“Cities nonetheless have long sought to entice mobile capital.”). 
44 See Barron & Frug, supra note 43, at 282–83 (discussing results of interviews with local officials 
identifying aversion to financial risks). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
86 
example, a foregone library expansion, reduced street cleaning, or an 
increased tax burden without offsetting benefits. Creating this kind of 
competitive disadvantage can reduce property values, which may be much 
more serious and salient to homeowners than a slightly higher tax bill. 
All of this has so far ignored the political dynamics of legal risks—the 
second source of municipal risk aversion—and those are equally important. 
In addition to reflecting their constituents’ risk aversion, local officials also 
have their own risk preferences. Tax increases impose a political cost for 
local officials that outpace their hardship for individual taxpayers.45 For 
example, the risk of a $200 increase on local property tax bills is relatively 
insignificant. The average taxpayer would not be willing to pay much of a 
premium to avoid the risk of only a $200 loss. But the political costs of that 
increase may be significant, indeed.46 For local officials, then, managing 
risk through the normal budgeting process by purchasing insurance can 
immunize them from the political costs of the occasional but unpredictable 
tax hike that would otherwise occur. Insurance therefore has a value to 
local officials independent of its monetary value to the taxpayers ultimately 
footing the bill. 
Notice, however, that the value of the insurance in this setting, too, 
will tend to vary inversely with the size of the government, just as it will if 
local officials are concerned primarily with taxpayers’ risk aversion. Cities 
can take advantage of the law of large numbers and build anticipated 
litigation costs directly into their budgets without the use of insurance.47 
Moreover, local officials are likely to be less attentive to the desires and 
 
45 This is related to the political salience of taxation, a topic that has received significant scholarly 
attention recently. See, e.g., Andrew T. Hayashi, The Legal Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1443, 1454 (2014) (“The political salience of a tax refers to the effect of its visibility or prominence on 
political decisions.” (footnote omitted)). While this literature primarily examines and evaluates how 
different systems of taxation either minimize or exacerbate political salience, it also implicitly 
acknowledges that taxation can have outsized political costs. Cf. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, 
Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 57 (2011) 
(“[C]onsumers do receive personal property tax bills, and, assuming these bills arrive before an election 
(as they must since assessed annually), personal property taxes would seem to have higher political 
salience . . . .”). 
46 See, e.g., Hal Dardick, Even with Emanuel Hike, City Homeowner Property Tax Rates Still 
Below Suburbs, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 13, 2015, 11:59 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
local/politics/ct-chicago-suburbs-tax-comparison-met-20151112-story.html [perma.cc/8MAZ-DSMH] 
(“Since at least the late 1980s, the property tax has been considered the third rail of Illinois politics.”); 
cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 108 (1998) (“[E]ven significant payouts in [civil rights] cases do not have much of 
an effect on the city’s operations, and only lead to change when they become an embarrassment.”). 
47 For discussion of the law of large numbers, see infra note 81. 
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concerns of individual taxpayers in large cities, which tend to be controlled 
by special interest groups and not local homeowner majorities.48 
This is not a particularly flattering account of the role of municipal 
insurance. If a municipality is buying insurance that is valuable to local 
officials but not to voters, then this resembles a traditional agency 
malfunction with taxpayers paying for a product they do not value. 
Professors Baker and Griffith have powerfully criticized Directors and 
Officers (D&O) insurance on precisely these grounds.49 They argue that 
entity insurance does not benefit shareholders who can be made risk neutral 
through a diversified investment portfolio.50 D&O insurance is best 
explained by its value to corporate managers whose individual fortunes are 
tied to the corporation’s balance sheet and cannot be so easily diversified. 
Municipal insurance, however, is critically different from D&O 
insurance because local taxpayers cannot diversify risk as easily as 
shareholders. In fact, for most homeowners, their houses represent their 
single largest investment.51 They are therefore likely to be extremely averse 
to risks that threaten property values, including adverse judgments that 
result in a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other local governments.52 
Adding political costs and agency malfunction to the mix does raise the 
possibility that local officials’ risk preferences may diverge from those of 
their constituents, but at least they are likely to move in the same direction. 
This is not a merely hypothetical account. Empirical evidence of local 
officials’ risk aversion comes from the response to a municipal insurance 
crisis in the 1980s. Due to a combination of factors, including 
municipalities’ increased exposure to liability as well as adverse market 
conditions and overly aggressive investment strategies by insurance 
companies, the private market for municipal insurance hardened in the mid-
1980s.53 Premiums skyrocketed, increasing sometimes 1500%.54 And in 
 
48 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 39–57 (2001). 
49 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 42. 
50 See id. 
51 FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 4 (“For the great majority of . . . homeowners, the equity in their 
home is the most important savings they have. . . . [M]edian housing equity is more than 11 times as 
large as median liquid assets among all homeowners . . . .” (quoting Gary V. Engelhardt & Christopher 
J. Mayer, Intergenerational Transfers, Borrowing Constraints, and Saving Behavior: Evidence from the 
Housing Market, 44 J. URB. ECON. 135, 136 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
52 See supra note 38. 
53 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L. J. 
1521, 1527 (1987) (discussing insurance crisis); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Market, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 115, 117–20 (1991) (discussing causes of market cycles, with focus on hardening of 
markets in 1980s). 
54 See Priest, supra note 53, at 1527. 
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some cases, insurance companies simply refused to write policies at any 
price.55 Municipalities responded by closing playgrounds and pools, and 
otherwise halting activities with liability exposure.56 
Viewed in coldly political terms, this is a remarkable reaction. It 
demonstrates that local officials in fact prioritized future fiscal costs over 
short-term political ones. Closing pools and playgrounds is a politically 
toxic decision for a municipal government.57 And local officials had an 
alternative; they could have kept the facilities open and simply paid for any 
resulting tort liability directly, instead of through a private insurance 
function. The fact that they did not, and chose instead to incur the political 
cost, demonstrates how averse local officials were to the risk of uninsured 
financial losses. 
The ultimate proof of ongoing local risk aversion can be found in local 
governments’ contemporary risk management practices. In reality, 
municipalities engage in varied and sometimes expensive responses to the 
risks of liability, demonstrating that local officials perceive some value—
whether economic or political—to shielding taxpayers from the risk of loss. 
The next Section surveys this complex constellation of practices, largely 
invisible in the legal literature, by risk averse municipalities. 
B. Municipal Risk Management Strategies and Practices 
Municipal risk management is an unusual topic in law. It is 
ubiquitous, extremely important for understanding the application of the 
law on the ground, and yet is virtually unstudied.58 The purpose of this 
Section is to remedy that deficiency and to shed light on municipal risk 
management practices. In so doing, it also sets the stage for the central 
question animating this project: why risk averse municipalities retain the 
risk of regulatory takings liability while offloading other similar risks. 
 
55 See id. 
56 Id. 
57 That political cost was recently on display when cities were pilloried for banning sledding on 
public hills due to liability concerns. See Melinda Wenner Moyer, Let Them Sled!, SLATE (Jan. 9, 2015, 
10:56 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/the_kids/2015/01/sledding_bans_from_iowa
_to_new_jersey_cities_are_outlawing_sledding_in_city.html [perma.cc/YKR9-4YXX]; see also Scott 
McFetridge, Liability Concerns Leave Cities Uneasy as Sledders Whoosh Down Snow-Covered Slopes, 
STAR TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.startribune.com/liability-concerns-prompt-some-cities-
to-limit-sledding/287450011/ [perma.cc/C8NM-C9FM]. For a modern version, see Kevin Leininger, On 
Thin Ice: Residents Fuming over Park Skating Ban, Offer to Help Bring ‘Gem’ Back, FORT WAYNE 
NEWS-SENTINEL (Jan. 17, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.news-sentinel.com/news/local/leininger/On-
thin-ice—Residents-fuming-over-park-skating-ban—offer-to-help-bring—gem—back [perma.cc/CK3L 
-XCB9] (discussing political costs of closing skating in city parks). 
58 But see Rappaport, supra note 9. 
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One reason for the paucity of scholarship in the area may be the 
difficulty in generalizing about risk management practices. Conversations 
with municipal risk managers undertaken for purposes of this research all 
began with a caution that risk management practices vary from government 
to government. That caution is well taken.59 Details undoubtedly vary in 
important respects between municipalities. Nevertheless, generalizations 
are possible with this caveat and can capture in broad form the range of 
approaches to managing municipal risk. 
Today, local governments face the possibility of liability on many 
fronts. The most significant is workers’ compensation.60 Environmental 
issues loom large, as do car accidents, and claims arising out of the 
maintenance of roads, streets and sidewalks.61 Constitutional violations can 
also create legal liability, either directly or more commonly under § 1983.62 
Section 1983 creates a private cause of action for constitutional violations, 
paradigmatically, when a municipality’s failure to supervise results in 
systemic police abuse, when local officials deny a license on discriminatory 
grounds or impermissibly suspend a business license, and so forth.63 
Plaintiffs will often sue both the government and the individual public 
official whose conduct is at issue.64 The ultimate costs, though, are almost 
certainly borne by the government and not by the individual official 
because most governments indemnify their employees for any resulting 
 
59 See N.C. DEP’T OF STATE TREASURER, POLICY MANUAL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 
SECTION 85: INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 33 (2014) [hereinafter POLICY MANUAL] (“Errors 
and omissions policies are not standard policies and the scope of coverage varies greatly between 
insurers.”). 
60 Qiao, supra note 8, at 43 (listing the most expensive and commonly generated sources of 
liability). 
61 Id. (identifying sources of liability and respective costs). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
63 Robert L. Pratter & Joanne A. Baker, The Status of Personal Liability and Comprehensive 
General Liability Insurance Coverage of Civil Rights Damages, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 259, 259 (1981) 
(“Enacted in 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 grants a right of recovery for money damages to any person who 
has been deprived by another acting under color of state law of any right, privilege or immunity granted 
by the Constitution or federal law.”). Originally, § 1983 suits were only available to challenge official 
government policies that violated constitutional rights. Over time, however, that limitation changed, and 
§ 1983 was expanded to cover conduct of public officials simply acting under color of law, even if their 
actions were not specifically contemplated or permitted under state or local law or policy. See Monroe 
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see also Martin J. Jaron, Jr., The Threat of Personal Liability Under the 
Federal Civil Rights Act: Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?, 
13 URB. LAW. 1, 5–8 (1981) (describing history of § 1983); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police 
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 888 (2014) (describing current § 1983 doctrine). 
64 Cf. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (establishing that § 1983 
liability can run against the government that employs a government actor); Jaron, supra note 63, at 8 
(“After Monell, a cause of action can still be stated against an individual public official, but his 
municipal employer can now be joined as well.”). 
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liability.65 Even when municipalities retain discretion to deny such 
indemnification, they rarely do.66 It is conventional wisdom that 
indemnification is necessary to avoid inhibiting public officials or deterring 
people from becoming public officials in the first place.67 Section 1983 
therefore imposes a substantial risk of liability on local governments. 
Municipal liability can be enormous. As of 2011, New Jersey 
municipalities, for example, were spending nearly $350 million per year in 
liability-related costs.68 New York City spent almost $2 million per month 
between 1994 and 1996 resolving lawsuits arising out of police misconduct 
alone.69 One recent study in New York State, based upon extremely 
conservative assumptions and excluding New York City, still found over 
$1 billion in legal liability for New York municipalities in a five-year 
period.70 A similar study in Louisiana found municipal liability of $100 
million, reflecting significant growth in recent years.71 These studies 
employ different methodologies and it is not appropriate to compare them 
against each other. Taken together, however, they demonstrate in no 
uncertain terms that litigation against municipalities is expensive. 
Risk management practices address these kinds of legal risks in two 
different ways. First and foremost, a municipal risk manager will seek to 
 
65 See, e.g., Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter 
Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 587, 587 (2000) (finding that New York City represents and indemnifies police officers in the 
overwhelming majority of civil rights litigation). This can be controversial. Some practitioners and 
scholars have worried that municipal indemnification for officials sued under § 1983 will underdeter 
wrongdoing. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 46, at 102 n.149; Donald J. Farley, 
Insurance Coverage in Civil Rights Cases, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 617, 634 (1984); Pratter & Baker, supra 
note 63, at 263. For a more comprehensive treatment of the relationship between indemnification and 
insurance, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 313 (1990). 
66 Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 46, at 108 (“The individual officer who is the subject of 
a police misconduct lawsuit found in favor of the plaintiff is rarely forced to pay the victim.”). See 
generally Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 63 (finding that indemnification is ubiquitous). 
67 Emery & Maazel, supra note 65, at 592 (“If our society is to encourage public service and attract 
qualified public servants, public officials cannot face financial ruin for every careless mistake that 
causes someone damage.”); Jaron, supra note 63, at 21. 
68 Marcus Rayner, Op-Ed: The High (and Hidden) Costs of Lawsuits Against Local Governments, 
N.J. SPOTLIGHT (May 26, 2011), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/11/0525/2157/ [perma.cc/3KVZ-
M4EZ]. 
69 Emery & Maazel, supra note 65, at 590. 
70 SYDNEY CRESSWELL & MICHAEL LANDON-MURRAY, ASSESSING THE FISCAL IMPACT OF 
LAWSUITS ON NEW YORK STATE MUNICIPALITIES 9 (2011), www.nylawsuitreform.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/06/Municipal-Lawsuit-Report-One.pdf [perma.cc/7UTX-4WF2]. 
71 See LA. LAWSUIT ABUSE WATCH, DRINKING FROM THE TAXPAYER TROUGH: THE COST OF 
LAWSUITS AGAINST LOUISIANA MUNICIPALITIES 5–6 (2011), http://www.houmatoday.com/assets/pdf/
HC22040212.pdf  [https://perma.cc/7JHJ-X88N] (estimating statewide costs of $94,271,472 over four-
year period). 
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implement policies and procedures that minimize the possibility of liability 
in the first place. A risk management office is typically involved in training 
municipal employees about their legal obligations, and offering advice and 
counsel when government actions run the risk of creating liability.72 Risk 
managers also help to develop and deploy procedures and practices that 
ensure compliance with the law. 
Second, in addition to limiting liability and losses ex ante, municipal 
risk management addresses the risks that nevertheless remain, despite a 
municipality’s best efforts. Municipalities engage in three general strategies 
to address risk: retain it, insure it privately, or join a municipal insurance 
pool. These are considered in order. 
1. Retention of Risk.—The most straightforward way for a 
municipality to handle risk is to retain the risk itself. This can happen 
through sophisticated funding mechanisms, such as the creation of a 
captive insurance company (effectively a subsidiary of the municipality 
that exists solely to insure the municipality).73 But a municipality can retain 
risk simply through the absence of insurance.74 Indeed, if a municipality 
makes no provision for the risk of a loss that occurs, it will have to bear the 
costs itself, which amounts to “noninsurance.”75 Colloquially, both 
phenomena are referred to as “self-insurance.”76 The phrase is a bit of a 
 
72 Risk management varies. For a sample of different approaches, see La. Mun. Ass’n, PowerPoint: 
Risk Management for Municipal Government, http://www.lma.org/Docs/Community%20Leadership/ 
Risk_Management_For_Municipal_Government2.pdf [perma.cc/8AB2-EEUL] (describing best 
practices to manage municipal risk); Risk Management, MICH. MUN. RISK MGMT. AUTHORITY, 
www.mmrma.org/risk-management/ [perma.cc/XV4W-H6QK] (describing risk management practices 
in Michigan, including model policies and training). For a more comprehensive discussion of risk 
management specifically in the context of policing, see Carol A. Archbold, Managing the Bottom Line: 
Risk Management in Policing, 28 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 30 (2005). 
73 See George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, 63 TUL. L. 
REV. 999, 1006–07 (1989) (discussing captive insurance as form of self-insurance); see also Thomas W. 
Rynard, The Local Government as Insured or Insurer: Some New Risk Management Alternatives, 
20 URB. LAW. 103, 111 (1988) (“A true self-insurance plan contemplates the establishment of a fund 
based on projections of future losses and the identification and measurement of possible and actual 
claims against the self-insured entity so that money from the fund may be set aside to pay those claims 
if and when they come due.” (emphasis omitted)). 
74 Some people distinguish between active and passive risk retention. They call the former self-
insurance. The latter simply amounts to ignoring the risk. See POLICY MANUAL, supra note 59, at 21 
(“Passive risk retention is not a risk management tool; no risk management decision has been made. 
Active retention, commonly known as ‘self-insurance,’ is when the unit identifies the risk and 
consciously selects risk retention as the appropriate alternative to finance the risk.”); cf. Schwartz, Tort 
Liability Insurance, supra note 65, at 315 (calling “self-insured” an “odd euphemism for ‘uninsured’”). 
75 See POLICY MANUAL, supra note 59, at 21–22. 
76 See, e.g., id. at 21. 
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misnomer but is nevertheless commonplace and usefully captures the 
approach.77 
Self-insurance is not an all-or-nothing proposition. In many instances, 
a municipality will pay to offload some risk—perhaps the risk of 
catastrophic loss—but retain other risk, perhaps through high deductibles 
or large co-pays.78 In this way, a municipality can self-insure against part 
but not all of a risk. Self-insurance (including noninsurance) is therefore a 
ubiquitous part of comprehensive risk management. A municipality cannot 
fully insure itself against everything and so always retains some risk of loss 
through self-insurance, broadly defined. 
As predicted in Section I.A, the extent of self-insurance tends to 
fluctuate with the size of the municipality. Larger cities retain more if not 
all risk of many different losses.79 This is partly because government 
officials in larger municipalities are likely to be less risk averse for the 
reasons described above.80 But cities also retain more risk because they can 
take advantage of the law of large numbers in ways that smaller 
municipalities cannot.81 For example, a large city can predict with greater 
accuracy what its overall § 1983 liability will be in any given year because 
the larger number of cases will tend to smooth out the outliers. There will 
certainly be fluctuations, but the unpredictability of those fluctuations will 
generally change inversely with city size. Large cities, in effect, are 
aggregators of risk just like insurance companies, and they do not need to 
outsource as much risk to take advantage of the law of large numbers and 
to make liability predictable.82 
This dynamic also means that larger cities can build the anticipated 
costs of legal liability directly into their budgets. They do this in two 
 
77 Insurance, by definition, involves the transferring of risk to a third party, which does not occur 
when the local government retains the risk and pays costs as they come due. See id. at 21. 
78 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 65, at 316 (“Almost every liability insurance policy written in this 
country has some cap or policy limits; above this cap the defendant is without insurance.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
79 Cf. id. (“By 1988, the City of New York was wholly self-insured; apart from a limited number of 
specialized policies, so were the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles, and the State of 
California.” (footnotes omitted)). 
80 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
81 See Priest, supra note 53, at 1540 (“Applied to insurance, the law of large numbers means that as 
one increases the number of insured persons possessing independent and identically-valued risks, one 
increases the accuracy of prediction of expected loss for each individual.”). 
82 While large cities still face risks of loss, those risks become increasingly predictable and 
therefore easier to price ex ante as the number of cases climbs. For the seminal discussion of the 
relationship between risk (which is calculable) and uncertainty (where the extent of risk is unknown and 
therefore difficult to calculate), see FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921). 
“‘[R]isk’ means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement . . . . We shall accordingly restrict 
the term ‘uncertainty’ to cases of the non-quantitative type.” Id. 
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different ways. First, they typically maintain a legal department, which is a 
kind of self-insurance against the costs of legal services. Instead of being 
subject to the vagaries of hourly billing, city attorneys draw a predictable 
salary that can be funded through the city’s annual budget. And second, 
cities can predict the annual costs of losses like liability judgments against 
them and can include that anticipated expense as a regular line item in their 
normal budgeting process. This helps to insulate property owners from 
unpredictable spikes in their tax bills. 
Where the city retains a separate account for paying out legal 
judgments—whether as a separate reserve pool or through a captive 
insurance company—it can specify the limits for payouts per claim, and 
even include exceptions for coverage.83 Liabilities not covered by the 
reserve pool—say, regulatory takings liability—must be paid from the 
general treasury, unless private insurance is available.84 
2. Private Insurance.—The most familiar way of handling risk 
involves procuring private insurance. This is an important piece of many 
municipalities’ risk management strategies. Even cities like Nashville, 
Tennessee, which are large enough to self-insure against most losses, 
maintain private insurance against catastrophic property damage.85 The 
nature of the private insurance, however, responds to the particular political 
dynamics of public risk management. 
Municipal insurance presents something of a puzzle: it represents a 
cost to the present government (premium payments) in order to avoid a cost 
in the future (defense costs and a possible adverse judgment). But this is 
not a payment that government actors are typically incentivized to make. 
Usually, political interests line up in favor of shifting risks and costs to the 
future.86 This puzzle largely disappears, however, with a more nuanced 
understanding of most municipal insurance today. 
The hard insurance market of the 1980s (described above87) caused 
many municipalities to exit private insurance markets—voluntarily or 
involuntarily—and to form municipal risk pools (described below88). 
Private insurance markets eventually opened back up and again became an 
 
83 In this way, a city that self-insures can make itself amenable to tort suits in states that allow 
municipalities to waive sovereign immunity up to the extent of insurance coverage. See infra note 119 
(discussing amenability to suit). 
84 Self-insurance can also operate ex post by issuing debt to cover losses that actually arise. See 
supra text accompanying note 38 (discussing this strategy and its limitations). 
85 Telephone Interview with Tom Cross, Assoc. Dir., Nashville Law Dep’t (May 20, 2014). 
86 See infra notes 94–96. 
87 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
88 See discussions infra Section I.B.3. 
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important component of municipal risk management by the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. But when insurance companies started underwriting new 
policies, they began to take a new form: many changed from occurrence-
based to claims-made policies.89 This technical-seeming change aligned 
private insurance markets with political incentives. 
Prior to the hard market of the 1980s, most municipal insurance 
policies were occurrence-based, meaning that they covered all liability 
arising out of occurrences within the covered period, regardless of when a 
claim was actually filed.90 Occurrence-based coverage comes with a long 
tail of liability for insurance companies, and therefore exposes them to 
claims that are sometimes filed long after the policy period expired.91 In 
fact, in Half Moon Bay’s litigation, described in the Introduction, the 
primary insurance coverage came from a thirty-year-old occurrence-based 
policy that had been in effect in the 1980s, when Half Moon Bay 
transformed the plaintiff’s property into wetlands.92 The municipality 
argued, successfully, that those actions had caused the liability, and were 
covered by the insurance policy that had been in effect at that time. 
Claims-made policies, in contrast, provide coverage only for claims 
actually made during the policy period regardless of when the underlying 
conduct occurred. Not only does this eliminate an insurance company’s 
exposure once the policy ends, it also allows insurance companies to assess 
the occurrences in the past that might generate claims during the policy 
period. That is, at least some of the claims covered by the policy will be 
based on conduct in the past, and the insurance company can therefore 
price the policy more accurately.93 
While insurance companies motivated the change away from 
occurrence-based policies to avoid the liability tail, claims-made policies 
are also much better tailored to the political dynamics of public insurance. 
 
89 Priest, supra note 53, at 1526; see also Jeffrey P. Griffin, Note, The Inapplicability of the Notice-
Prejudice Rule to Pure Claims-Made Insurance Policies, 42 CONN. L. REV. 235, 242–46 (2009) 
(discussing rise of claims-made policies). 
90 See Griffin, supra note 89 at 242–46; see also Carolyn M. Frame, ‘Claims-Made’ Liability 
Insurance: Closing the Gaps with Retroactive Coverage, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 165 (1987) (discussing history 
of claims-made policies generally); Rebecca M. Bratspies, Splitting the Baby: Apportioning 
Environmental Liability Among Triggered Insurance Policies, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1215, 1217 n.13. 
91 See Frame, supra note 90, at 178 (“One of the major advantages of the claims-made policy to the 
insurer is the exclusion of tail liability.”). 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 10–12 (describing Half Moon Bay litigation). 
93 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. 
REV. 403, 413 n.24 (1985) (“Claims-made pricing requires much less prediction of the future because 
only the claims that will be filed during the forthcoming policy period need be predicted.”). See 
generally Steven P. Garmisa, Claims-Made Policies: Let the Lawyer Beware, 78 ILL. B.J. 292 (1990) 
(describing dynamics of claims-made policies). 
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According to a conventional description, public officials have a strong 
incentive to favor the present over the future.94 Immediate benefits are 
politically valuable, while future costs are likely to be borne by other 
officeholders. As a result, self-interested officials are likely to take risks 
that have significant upside potential in the short term so long as the 
downside costs can be shifted into the future. This dynamic is particularly 
familiar at the local level.95 State-imposed limits on municipal debt are a 
response to this very dynamic.96 The worry—with an unfortunate basis in 
history—is that local officials will incur excessive debts to engage in 
speculative ventures.97 If the speculation pays off, the government reaps the 
immediate rewards (the new baseball team, the revitalized neighborhood, 
the successful municipal facility, and so forth). But if it does not, the costs 
will be borne by future taxpayers who have to service the debt. At least 
some if not most of the costs would come due only after the public official 
leaves office. 
From this perspective, the existence of municipal insurance is quite 
surprising. Insurance requires a government to pay up front in order to 
avoid a risk sometime in the future—exactly the opposite of the concern 
animating municipal debt limits and other limits on local officials.98 
The development of claims-made policies, however, realigns 
incentives. A government that buys a claims-made policy will be protected 
from costs that actually arise during the policy period. This is not coverage 
for the future costs of their conduct while in office, but instead insurance 
against the costs arising from conduct in the past (for which they or their 
predecessors may have been responsible). The local officials paying for the 
insurance coverage are much more likely to be the ones benefitting from 
it.99 
Although most policies are claims-made, there is considerable variety 
in the specific forms that they take. Local governments typically purchase 
one or more of a number of different kinds of policies providing different 
 
94 See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 39, at 935. 
95 See id. at 939 (discussing political dynamics of entrenchment). 
96 See id. at 906–07. 
97 In the mid-nineteenth century, for example, local officials throughout the country sought to 
influence the location of the railroads. They believed—quite correctly—that a station in town would 
generate substantial economic benefits. Many spent lavishly to try to attract the railroads, but of course 
only some succeeded. For those, the investment was a good one. But all the others that invested in 
failed campaigns were saddled with increased debt but had no new railroad revenue to repay them. The 
consequences were devastating, leading to a massive crisis in municipal finance. See id. (describing this 
history and citing sources). 
98 See id. at 925–26 (discussing justifications for municipal debt limits). 
99 This will only not be true of litigation that spans more than one election cycle. 
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types of coverage.100 Property insurance covers losses from fire, flood, 
theft, and the like.101 Automobile insurance can be more or less 
comprehensive, and cover specific or comprehensive lists of damage to 
government-owned vehicles.102 A general liability policy covers personal 
injury claims and other losses resulting from tort liability, and from tort-
like claims.103 An umbrella policy provides excess coverage above and 
beyond the policy limits in the other policies.104 Specialized policies 
provide workers’ compensation coverage, and sometimes coverage for 
electronic records and data recovery, marine insurance, “boiler and 
machinery” insurance, medical malpractice insurance for municipal 
hospitals and clinics, and others.105 These are all relatively straightforward 
and provide the kind of coverage one might reasonably expect from their 
names. 
Somewhat less familiar is an Errors and Omissions (E&O) policy, 
which is a form of professional malpractice insurance, analogous to 
Directors and Officers insurance for private companies. An E&O policy 
provides coverage for “wrongful acts” by municipal actors, whether school 
officials, police officers, EMTs, firefighters, or other municipal agents.106 A 
wrongful act is defined as “[a]ny actual or alleged error, omission, 
misstatement or misleading statement, act of neglect or breach of duty by 
an insured while acting within the scope of their duties as officials or 
employees of the covered organization.”107 These are the policies typically 
triggered by civil rights or other constitutional violations flowing from 
 
100 See, e.g., PA. GOVERNOR’S CTR. FOR LOCAL GOV’T SERVS., INSURANCE PRIMER FOR 
MUNICIPAL SECRETARIES 4 (4th ed. 2003), http://www.newpa.com/download/insurance-primer-for-
municipal-secretaries-pdf/ [https://perma.cc/BUY8-85GZ] [hereinafter INSURANCE PRIMER] (describing 
“typical” insurance policy packages). 
101 See, e.g., id. 
102 See, e.g., POLICY MANUAL, supra note 59, at 28–29 (describing automobile coverage). 
103 Comprehensive general liability policies typically cover municipalities for liability resulting 
from occurrences that cause either bodily injury or property damage. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 65, at 
625. The breadth of these policies is often contested, however, and extensive literature has examined, 
for example, whether they cover civil rights claims. See id. 
104 POLICY MANUAL, supra note 59, at 31. 
105 Id. at 27. For a list of types of coverage, see id. at 23–34; see also INSURANCE PRIMER, supra 
note 100, at 6. 
106 See INSURANCE PRIMER, supra note 100, at 6. In many municipalities, police misconduct is 
covered by a specialized Police Professional Liability policy. See id. (recommending all municipalities 
that provide police services purchase Police Professional Liability coverage). 
107 POLICY MANUAL, supra note 59, at 32. In the words of one insurance manual for local officials: 
“This type of coverage is designed to cover the liability arising out of the business decisions of public 
officials and employees.” Id. 
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decisions made by government officials. Examples include failure to 
supervise, employment actions, tax assessments, and land use decisions.108 
There are important differences between general liability policies and 
E&O policies. General liability policies provide coverage for occurrences 
resulting in bodily injury or property damage. Occurrences in general 
liability policies, however, are limited to “fortuitous” events, like property 
damage resulting from a car accident or fire.109 E&O policies, on the other 
hand, provide coverage for intentional acts or omissions by municipal 
officials or employees acting within the scope of their duties and so are not 
limited to fortuitous events.110 Policy choices that adversely affect private 
interests will trigger E&O coverage. For example, if a municipality closes a 
road to construction vehicles, affecting costs to a developer of constructing 
a municipal building, the resulting contract claim would trigger coverage 
under the E&O policy.111 Most importantly for present purposes—and as 
described in more detail below—litigation arising out of land use decisions 
will typically implicate an E&O policy, even though such policies exclude 
coverage for regulatory takings claims.112 
Each of these forms of insurance serves two—and sometimes three—
important purposes. First and most obviously, the use of private insurance 
offloads the ultimate risk of litigation costs and liability. The insurance 
company will typically pay both legal fees and any adverse judgment, as 
specified by the policy limits.113 Insurance, then, smoothens potential spikes 
in liability, converting them into constant and predictable costs in the form 
of insurance premiums. This is particularly important for a local 
government because premiums can be included in the normal budgeting 
 
108 See, e.g., INSURANCE PRIMER, supra note 100, at 6 (“Claims usually arise from decisions made 
by elected or appointed officials that allegedly cause loss of revenue, a loss of a property right, planning 
and zoning issues, licensing, free speech, privacy and alleged Constitutional violations.”). 
109 See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Ky. 2010) (“[T]he 
concept of fortuity is inherent in all liability policies, and . . . a loss [is] fortuitous if it was not 
intended.” (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commonwealth of Ky., Nat. Res. & Envtl. Prot. Cabinet, 
179 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
110 POLICY MANUAL, supra note 59, at 32–33 (describing E&O policies). 
111 See id. at 32 (“An example of an error and omission covered claim would be a decision by a 
governing board that results in a financial loss to a contractor who then sues the governing board 
members for damages.”). 
112 A general liability policy may be implicated, too, depending on a particular state’s interpretation 
of the word “occurrence.” In some states, general liability policies have been extended even to civil 
rights claims, reasoning that even if a municipal agent acted intentionally, she may not have intended 
the resulting injury. Farley, supra note 65, at 625 (concluding that many courts will find 
“occurrence[s]” covered by a general liability policy include intentional acts so long as the resulting 
injury was not specifically intended). 
113 See infra note 159. 
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process in a way that unpredictable, actual judgments in litigation often 
cannot be included. 
Purchasing private insurance also then serves a second and closely 
related purpose: it allows a municipality to purchase the insurance 
company’s actuarial expertise. A municipality that self-insures and sets its 
own loss reserves must determine its likely annual liability.114 But that 
calculation can be complicated and can require both legal expertise and a 
sophisticated understanding of probability. While large municipalities often 
have a professional risk management practice in house and can set aside 
appropriate loss reserves in its budget, private insurance will effectively 
take over some of the more complicated aspects of that function for smaller 
municipalities.115 Insurance premiums can therefore be conceptualized, in 
part, as payment for that service. 
The third and last role for municipal insurance applies only to general 
liability policies but is worth highlighting because of its important parallel 
to regulatory takings claims: the use of private insurance to spread costs 
within society.116 The existence of municipal liability insurance requires a 
special explanation because local governments are entitled to a narrow 
form of sovereign immunity called governmental immunity.117 This is not 
full-blown sovereign immunity because it is available exclusively for tort 
liability, and then only for actions undertaken in a governmental as 
opposed to a proprietary capacity.118 However, where governmental 
immunity applies, most states have waived local immunity to the extent of 
a municipality’s insurance coverage.119 Details vary state by state, but in 
 
114 See Rynard, supra note 73, at 109–12 (describing the “art” of pricing risk and the need of local 
governments that self-insure to price risk effectively). 
115 See Peter C. Young & John Hood, Risk and the Outsourcing of Risk Management Services: The 
Case of Claims Management, 23 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 109, 109–10 (2003) (describing outsourcing 
of municipal risk management for municipalities without the capacity to manage risk themselves). 
116 This role of insurance is well established. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as 
Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1507 (2010) (“[I]t can be said 
without exaggeration that liability insurance has played a major, perhaps dominant, role in the 
development of modern tort law.”); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The 
Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 26 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 4, 30 (1983) (discussing 
relationship between insurance and social policy). 
117 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-51(a)–(b) (2016); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542 (2016); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 29-20-201 (2016); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-201 (LexisNexis 2016); Meyer v. Walls, 
489 S.E.2d 880, 884 (N.C. 1997); cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407 (2016) (requiring gross 
negligence for tort liability). 
118 Criticism of the distinction is longstanding. See, e.g., Gerald R. Gibbons, Liability Insurance 
and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Government, 1959 DUKE L. J. 588 (1959). 
119 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); § 33-24-
51(a)–(b). 
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general a municipality purchasing insurance is actually exposing itself to 
liability that it is empowered to avoid.120 That is, by purchasing liability 
insurance, the local government is waiving the governmental immunity it 
would otherwise receive, at least up to the limits of the policy. Why would 
it do so? 
Public officials evidently recognize that they are serving their 
constituents by providing some protection from municipal torts.121 In a 
sense, by consenting to liability, the municipality is providing a kind of 
insurance to its tort victims who might otherwise be without redress.122 
General liability insurance for these kinds of claims therefore inverts the 
traditional relationship between risk and insurance. Municipalities are not 
securing insurance to offload risks that they do not want to bear 
themselves. Instead, municipalities are insuring themselves in order to 
accept risk. And they are doing so to reflect a distinct normative 
perspective on the appropriate allocation of costs in society.123 They are 
effectively operating as insurers themselves—insurers whose mandatory 
“premiums” are collected through tax revenue, but whose function is still to 
spread the risk of certain kinds of individual losses among all taxpayers.124 
This loss spreading function of insurance characterizes third-party liability 
insurance regimes broadly, where costs are borne by the tortfeasor instead 
of by the victim (and the victim’s first-party insurance, if any).125 
At this level of generality, the loss spreading function of insurance is 
remarkably similar to the underlying justification for regulatory takings 
law. As the Supreme Court has held, the purpose of the Takings Clause is 
to prevent some individual property owners from bearing “public burdens 
 
120 Cf. 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53:9 (3d ed. 2013) 
(surveying approaches). 
121 Cf. James Fleming, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 
610, 614 (1955) (justifying encroachments on governmental immunity in part because “it is better to 
distribute [losses caused by government actors] widely among the beneficiaries of government than to 
let them rest on the individual victims”). 
122 See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 118, at 590 (acknowledging that principal criticism of immunity 
“is its inconsistency with the modern socio-ethical notion that the risk of wrongful injury should not be 
borne by the individual upon whom the misadventure fortuitously falls, but by society as a whole”). 
123 The same normative underpinnings explain why municipalities indemnify public officials, such 
as police officers for § 1983 liability. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 65, at 620. 
124 Cf. Gibbons, supra note 118, at 590 (“A means of equitably distributing the burden of the risk 
[of torts] has been available to the federal and state governments and even to large cities in the form of 
taxation.”). 
125 For one treatment of this distinction, see Winter, supra note 53, at 115–16; see also Roger C. 
Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining the Standard of 
Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 16–17 (1992) 
(“[A] real liability policy obligates the insurer to pay the third-party tort victim once the insured’s 
liability has been established by settlement or court action.”). 
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which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”126 It is, in effect, a kind of mandatory third-party insurance, 
covering the losses of affected property owners, just like liability 
insurance.127 Governmental liability—whether for takings or torts—reflects 
a substantive if implicit decision about how costs should be allocated in 
society. The difference is the lack of private insurance for takings claims, 
as described in Part II. But first, there is one more alternative form of risk 
spreading to consider. 
3. Municipal Risk Pools.—The last time public sector risk 
management received anything more than passing scholarly attention in the 
legal literature was during the sustained “insurance crisis” in the mid-
1980s.128 At that time, sweeping changes in the insurance industry 
transformed municipalities’ exposure to risk, although no one was sure 
exactly why.129 The effects, though, were painfully obvious. Premiums on 
some insurance products—particularly liability insurance—skyrocketed by 
“400%, 1000%, 1500%, and more.”130 Other insurance products simply 
disappeared from the market. As Professor George Priest described in a 
leading article from that time: 
Municipalities and other governmental entities faced . . . extreme premium 
increases or the unavailability of market insurance coverage altogether. Some 
cities closed jails and suspended police patrols until insurance coverage was 
obtained. Parks and forest preserves were closed. Fourth of July celebrations 
were cancelled because of concerns over uninsured liability.131 
This crisis precipitated enduring changes in the insurance industry and 
in municipal insurance in particular (some of which have already been 
discussed above).132 In the absence of affordable insurance, or any private 
 
126 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
127 The analogy between takings law and insurance is not new. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, 
Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be Abolished, and Would “Takings 
Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 491 (2003). This analogy, however, has typically 
ended with viewing the government as the insurer. No one has considered whether the “insurance” 
function of takings law requires what amounts to reinsurance through private insurance companies to 
function effectively. 
128 See, e.g., Richard N. Clark et al., Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic 
Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988); Priest, The Antitrust Suits, supra note 73; see also James R. 
Hackney, A Proposal for State Funding of Municipal Tort Liability, 98 YALE L.J. 389, 389 nn.2–3 
(1988) (collecting sources). 
129 See Priest, supra note 53, at 1523 (considering various theories, including collusion among 
insurance companies, an adverse interest rate environment, and a rapid increase in corporate liability). 
130 Id. at 1527. 
131 Id. at 1521–22 (footnotes omitted). 
132 See supra note 89 (discussing change from occurrence-based to claims-made policies). 
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insurance products at all in some cases, many municipalities turned to 
insurance pools to spread their risk. Groups of municipalities joined 
together, paying premiums into the pool and securing liability coverage in 
return. In this way, smaller municipalities could, together, take advantage 
of the law of large numbers, and also maintain coverage over risks that 
private insurers refused to provide.133 
In most instances, municipal insurance pools are expressly authorized 
by the state. Typically, a private not-for-profit organization then operates as 
a plan sponsor and administers the pool.134 That not-for-profit is governed 
by a board of directors constituted by representatives of municipal 
participants in the pool.135 The plan sponsor is nominally an independent 
entity, but it operates in the service of the members of the insurance pool. 
While municipal insurance pools gained real traction in the United 
States in the 1980s, they were hardly a new invention. In 1903, Municipal 
Mutual was founded in the United Kingdom to respond to a hardening 
insurance market there.136 In the United States, the first municipal insurance 
pool was formed in 1974 by the Texas Municipal League.137 By 2001, there 
were hundreds of formal and informal pools, covering approximately 
35,000 public entities.138 More recent data is simply not available, but as of 
the early 2000s, it appears that most insurance pools include a professional 
staff.139 Most also offer more or less comprehensive risk management 
services, including actuarial expertise, legal advice, and other functions 
designed to minimize exposure to risk ex ante.140 In short, these risk pools 
provide broad risk management services in addition to pure insurance. 
 
133 Participation in a municipal risk pool is treated like private insurance for purposes of 
governmental immunity and amounts to a waiver of tort immunity up to the limits of the coverage. See, 
e.g., Lyles v. City of Charlotte, 477 S.E.2d 150 (N.C. 1996). 
134 See, e.g., CRESSWELL & LANDON-MURRAY, supra note 70, at 4 (describing New York’s pool 
sponsor as a nonprofit company); About CIRMA: Serving Connecticut’s Municipalities, Public Schools 
& Local Public Agencies, CONN. INTERLOCAL RISK MGMT. AGENCY, cirma.ccm-ct.org/Plugs/about-
cirma.aspx [perma.cc/VN8J-ACH4] (identifying Connecticut Interlocal Risk Management Agency as a 
not-for-profit association). 
135 See, e.g., MICH. MUN. LEAGUE LIAB. & PROP. POOL, INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONTRACT 3 
(2014), www.mml.org/insurance/pool/pdf/p_igc_2014.pdf [perma.cc/Q46J-YZAG] (describing 
membership in the pool); THE OHIO MUN. LEAGUE, THE OHIO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE AND ITS SERVICES 
(2016), http://www.omlohio.org/About.htm [perma.cc/L4BA-292P] (describing membership in Ohio 
Municipal League pool). 
136 MARTIN FONE & PETER C. YOUNG, PUBLIC SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT 272 (2000). 
137 Qiao, supra note 8, at 37. 
138 Id. at 38 (estimating that insurance pools covered approximately 40% of the total market of 
municipal insurance by the late 1990s). 
139 Id. (identifying between 250–285 pools operating with professional staffs). 
140 Telephone Interview with Ken Canning, Dir. of Risk Mgmt. Servs., Vt. League of Cities and 
Towns (June 17, 2014). 
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At first blush, the proliferation of municipal insurance pools is much 
less surprising than the fact that private insurance remains in the market at 
all. In theory, risk pools should be able to provide a better product for 
municipalities at less cost because they are not seeking to make a profit.141 
That profit motive, however, can sometimes lead private insurers to out-
compete municipal pools. Competitive insurance markets create market 
pressures for companies to lower costs by pricing risk more effectively, 
tightly managing administrative costs, or through other business 
innovations. To the extent municipal insurance pools operate in markets 
where private insurance is not readily available, their prices may actually 
be worse despite (or perhaps because of) the absence of a profit motive. 
The eventual demise of England’s Municipal Mutual in 1992 is 
evidence that these concerns are not entirely speculative.142 After its 
formation in 1903, Municipal Mutual thrived in England for nearly ninety 
years.143 It was finally undone, however, by a combination of complacency, 
increasing exposure of municipalities to liability, and imprudent 
investments.144 Municipalities in the United Kingdom were left seeking 
private insurance products, completing a great circle of risk management 
practices.145 
Ultimately, municipal risk management consists of some combination 
of self-insurance, private insurance, and risk pooling. Local governments 
can change which risks they retain and which are insured, and can adjust 
their risk management strategies according to their risk preferences in fine-
grained ways—but not for regulatory takings. Neither private insurance nor 
municipal insurance pools provide coverage for regulatory takings 
litigation. The next Part explores the fact of the exclusion and its 
consequences, and Part III turns to an explanation and some proposed 
responses. 
II. THE ABSENCE OF INSURANCE FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS 
Local governments have a number of tools for dealing with risk, but 
the last Part demonstrated that smaller municipalities often seek to offload 
risk by purchasing insurance or participating in municipal risk pools. This 
makes sense. It is costly for risk averse local governments to bear too much 
risk. It is particularly surprising, then, that insurance is not available for 
 
141 Cf. id. (identifying advantages of risk pools). 
142 FONE & YOUNG, supra note 136 (describing history of Municipal Mutual). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. 
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regulatory takings claims. This Part first identifies the fact that municipal 
insurance policies—everywhere except Minnesota, inexplicably—exclude 
coverage for regulatory takings claims. It then argues that this exclusion 
distorts local officials’ regulatory incentives. It concludes by arguing that 
this has distributional consequences, adversely affecting smaller local 
governments more than larger ones. 
Part III explores the nature of regulatory takings risk in some detail, 
but it is nevertheless useful here to have a sense of the kinds of claims that 
are excluded from insurance coverage. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause and its state analogues prohibit the government from taking 
property without paying just compensation.146 Where the government 
exercises its power of eminent domain to condemn property, there is no 
question that it has to pay. The more difficult question arises when a 
government has merely regulated property but nevertheless significantly 
restricts its usefulness and value. If the regulatory burden is substantial 
enough, it might rise to the level of a taking, even in the absence of the 
explicit use of eminent domain.147 Such regulatory takings can arise from 
overly restrictive zoning, the denial of subdivision permits or variances, 
onerous environmental regulations, and many other local regulatory 
actions.148 Most of these regulatory takings claims will be evaluated under 
the ad hoc Penn Central balancing test, which weighs—in relatively 
inscrutable fashion—the character of the regulation, the extent of the 
regulation’s interference with distinct (or perhaps reasonable) investment-
backed expectations, and the resulting diminution in value.149 As it turns 
out, municipal insurance excludes coverage for both condemnation and for 
regulatory takings. 
A. The Inverse Condemnation Exclusion 
It might seem difficult to generalize about the content of insurance 
coverage for takings claims. Insurance policies are not legislation; they do 
not apply statewide, for example, but are specific to each insurer and 
insured. As a practical matter, however, municipal insurance policies—
whether private or governed by an insurance pool—tend to have very 
similar if not identical provisions.150 And courts follow other courts’ 
 
146 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
147 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
148 For consideration of a variety of claims, see infra text accompanying notes 173–75. 
149 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. For a thorough discussion of each of the elements, see 
Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 329–30 (2007). 
150 See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010); Farley, supra note 65, at 621 (“The coverages generally do not 
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interpretations of similar policy language.151 It is therefore possible to look 
to case law to understand the substantive content of insurance coverage 
within a state. That is especially true of insurance for takings litigation, 
because the relevant policy language is remarkably consistent across 
policies, whether private or as part of a pool. 
An insurance policy is, ultimately, a contract between the insured and 
the insurer (whether a private company or a municipal pool), and it defines 
the insurer’s obligation to cover specified losses. It therefore sets out both 
the losses that are covered and also certain exclusions, which are losses that 
would otherwise have been insured but are specifically carved out from 
coverage. For example, a homeowner’s policy might cover all losses to a 
house resulting from accident or natural occurrence, but exclude damage 
resulting from wind or a meteor strike.152 
If a loss falls within an insurance policy’s coverage, the insurer not 
only covers the ultimate loss—up to the policy limit and minus any 
deductible—but also the costs of defending the litigation. These are two 
separate components of an insurer’s obligations: a duty to defend and a 
duty to indemnify. An insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to 
indemnify, because the duty to defend arises simply from the face of the 
plaintiff’s allegations; if the allegations involve conduct that is ultimately 
covered by the policy, then the insurer must defend regardless of the merits 
of the claim or the likelihood of success.153 Texas courts colorfully call this 
the “eight corners” rule.154 The four corners of the complaint are judged 
against the four corners of the insurance policy, and coverage—the 
insurer’s duty to defend—is determined on that basis. The duty to 
 
vary in language from policy to policy, regardless of the issuing company.”); see also Christopher C. 
French, Insuring Landslides: America’s Uninsured Natural Catastrophes 10 n.39 (Penn State Law, 
Research Paper No. 4-2015, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2566238 [https://perma.cc/64T5-7DNT] 
(collecting sources). But see Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1263 (2011) (finding surprising variance in the terms of homeowners insurance policies 
compared to those of other forms of insurance). 
151 See, e.g., Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 229 F. Supp. 2d 668, 684 (S.D. Tex. 
2002) (looking to prior case law to define the phrase “arising out of” in insurance policy). 
152 The policy also specifies how much of the losses the insurer will cover. It may, for example, 
include a reservation—like a co-pay—where the insured must pay either a percentage or fixed amount 
of the loss below or above a certain amount. For example, an insurance policy might provide coverage 
for all losses over $250,000, or 50% of all losses below $250,000, and 80% of all additional losses, and 
so forth. The permutations are endless. 
153 Nutmeg Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (“The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are 
distinct and separate.”); City of Collinsville v. Ill. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Ass’n, 904 N.E.2d 70, 75 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“[A]n insured contracts for and has a right to expect two separate and distinct 
duties from an insurer: (1) the duty to defend . . . and (2) the duty to indemnify . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
154 Nutmeg Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 675. 
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indemnify, in contrast, only arises from “proven, adjudicated facts 
establishing liability in the underlying suit.”155 In general, the insured bears 
the burden of demonstrating that the insurance policy covers the alleged 
conduct, but ambiguities are generally resolved against the insurer.156 
Where a plaintiff brings a number of claims, the duty to defend will be 
triggered if the insurance policy covers any of the plaintiff’s claims.157 
Frequently, plaintiffs suing municipalities will bring a variety of claims 
articulating multiple theories of liability.158 Some may be covered by a 
municipal insurance policy, some may not be covered losses, and still 
others may be subject to exclusions. Generally, insurance coverage of even 
one claim will obligate the insurance company to defend the litigation. Any 
ultimate liability may be apportioned among claims, and an insurer will 
only pay for the damages resulting from covered claims.159 
The exclusion of coverage for regulatory takings claims can be 
understood against this backdrop. Almost every municipal insurance 
policy—whether private, or as part of a risk pool—contains some version 
of the following exclusion from coverage:160 
 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 676; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 531, 531 (1996) (“The first principle of insurance law is captured by the maxim contra 
proferentem, which directs that ambiguities in a contract be interpreted ‘against the drafter,’ who is 
almost always the insurer.” (footnotes omitted)). 
157 St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. 999 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. App. 1999). 
158 See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (“[Plaintiff’s] five substantive claims are based on the Fifth Amendment’s taking clause as 
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and common law principles of estoppel and unjust enrichment.”). 
159 Allan Windt, Determining Whether Grounds for Settlement Are Outside Policy Coverage, 
32 INS. LITIG. REP. 407, 407 (2010) (“The insurer should have to reimburse the insured only to the 
extent that the settlement compromised claims that were covered by the policy.” (footnote omitted)). 
160 See, e.g., CNA, Public Officials Liability Policy, OLD NAT’L INS. RISK PARTNERS (Nov. 1997), 
https://www.oldnationalins.com/pdfs/Insurance/JWF-Sample-Policies/Public-Officials-Liability-
Policy.pdf [perma.cc/RPX2-ZCLK] (excluding coverage for “[a]ny ‘claim’ arising out of inverse con-
demnation, adverse possession, dedication by adverse use, [or] eminent domain”); Liability 
Memorandum of Coverage, N.D. INS. RESERVE FUND 8 (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.ndirf.com/image/cache/GL1001.pdf [https://perma.cc/L88M-D4WP] (excluding coverage 
for “[l]iability arising out of or in any way connected with any operation of the principles of eminent 
domain, condemnation proceedings, or ‘inverse condemnation’, by whatever name called”); 
Memorandum of Coverage, CAL. JOINT POWERS RISK MGMT. AUTH. 18 (July 1, 2011), 
http://www.cjprma.org/docs/library/memorandum-of-coverage-2011-2012.pdf [perma.cc/NU8B-8M26] 
(excluding coverage for “[c]laims arising out of or in connection with land use regulation, land use 
planning, the principles of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings or inverse condemnation by 
whatever name called”); Memorandum of Coverage, N.M. PUB. SCHOOLS INS. AUTH. 4 (July 1, 2013), 
https://nmpsia.com/PDFs/NMPSIA%20MOC%201.PDF [https://perma.cc/RTS3-2JH7] (excluding 
coverage for “liability arising out of or in connection with the principles of eminent domain, 
condemnation or inverse condemnation, by whatever name called”); MO. PUB. ENTITY RISK MGMT. 
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EXCLUSIONS 
This Memorandum [or policy] does not apply to: 
. . . . 
Claims arising out of or in connection with inverse condemnation caused by 
the construction of a public work or public improvement, land use regulation, 
land use planning, the principles of eminent domain, or condemnation 
proceedings by whatever name called . . . .161 
Non-experts would be forgiven for missing the significance of this 
exclusion. But in fact, it excludes insurance coverage for all regulatory 
takings claims against a municipality. To see how and why this works, one 
 
FUND, MEMORANDUM OF COVERAGE (on file with author) (excluding coverage for “proceedings to 
condemn property or inverse condemnation by whatever name”); Nat’l Cas. Co., Public Entity Policy: 
Public Officials Liablity Coverage Form Claims Made Coverage, EUCLID PUB. SECTOR 3, 
http://euclidps.com/2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Public_Officials_Liability_II_PE_PO_2_0802.pdf 
[perma.cc/3GXJ-GM98] (excluding coverage for “any damages arising out of land use planning or 
municipal zoning”); Public Entity Liability Policy, AM. INS. COMPANY (Jan. 1, 2008), 
http://www.acegroup.com/us-en/assets/public-officials-policy-pf-23536.pdf [perma.cc/PE6X-WESW] 
(excluding coverage for claims arising out of “eminent domain, condemnation, inverse condemnation, 
temporary or permanent taking, adverse possession or dedication by adverse use”); Public Officials 
Liability Policy with Employment Practices Liability Coverage, IRONSHORE SPECIALTY INS. COMPANY 
(May 2010), http://www.ironshore.com/pdfs/products/Public_Officials_Liability_Policy.pdf 
[perma.cc/H3KB-LVDN] (excluding coverage for claims arising out of “inverse condemnation, 
temporary or permanent taking, adverse possession or dedication by adverse use”); Sample Public 
Officials’ Liability Coverage Form, TRIDENT INS., https://www.tridentinsurance.net/docs/
SpecimenPolicyForms/PublicEntity/PublicOfclsCovDec.pdf [perma.cc/6JYH-LZHB] (excluding 
coverage “resulting from proceedings in eminent domain or from inverse condemnation, by whatever 
name called”). But cf. Catherine A. Jones et al., “One of These Things Is Not Like the Others?” – How 
and Why a JPA is Not Like an Insurance Company, PUB. AGENCY RISK MGMT. ASS’N 1 (Feb. 9, 2014), 
http://parma.com/sites/default/files/files/pdf/c1_oneofthesethingsisnotliketheother.doc [https://perma. 
cc/KM3P-FFPK] (identifying statutory authorization allowing municipalities to purchase inverse 
condemnation insurance, but not demonstrating that such insurance exists). The challenges of 
examining even a meaningful sample of insurance policies makes such an empirical project prohibitive, 
especially since most insurance policies are not publicly available. For an example of a heroic effort to 
study the content of insurance policies empirically, see Schwarcz, supra note 150. It is therefore no 
surprise that “the last systematic attempt to examine the content of different insurance policies was a 
1937 law review article.” Id. at 1274–75. Informal conversations conducted with insurance underwriters 
and municipal risk managers further confirmed that inverse condemnation is excluded from insurance 
coverage. There appears to be only one exception. See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, LMCIT COVERAGE 
GUIDE (2015), http://www.lmc.org/media/document/1/lmcitliabilitycoverageguide.pdf?inline=true 
[perma.cc/D6E9-RSF3] [hereinafter LMCIT COVERAGE] (describing coverage for regulatory takings). 
The Minnesota coverage is discussed infra text accompanying note 179. 
161 Pooled Liability Program, Memorandum of Coverage, VECTOR CONTROL JOINT POWERS 
AGENCY 12, http://www.vcjpa.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Entry 
Id=10743&Command=Core_Download&PortalId=13&TabId=572 [https://perma.cc/23UF-8BLL] 
(emphasis added). 
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must understand the nature and scope of the inverse condemnation claims 
being excluded. 
Inverse condemnation is the doctrinal mechanism for vindicating a 
regulatory takings claim in state court. Formally, inverse condemnation is 
an eminent domain proceeding triggered by the property owner instead of 
the government (it is the “inverse” of a traditional condemnation initiated 
by the government).162 It is a claim by the property owner that the 
government’s challenged regulation is, in effect, an exercise of eminent 
domain. Functionally, it is the state cause of action for alleging a regulatory 
taking and seeking just compensation. 
This is not just a subset of regulatory takings claims, however. Inverse 
condemnation is, for all intents and purposes, the exclusive means of 
bringing regulatory takings claims against a municipality or the state. As 
the United States Supreme Court explained in Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,163 the Takings 
Clause does not prevent the government from taking property; it only 
prevents the government from taking property without just compensation. 
A local government therefore does not violate the Takings Clause until it 
has both taken property and denied compensation. The mechanism for 
seeking such compensation is through an inverse condemnation action.164 
Therefore, before a property owner has a ripe regulatory takings claim 
under the Fifth Amendment directly, she must first pursue her inverse 
condemnation claim in state court.165 But that is not the only justiciability 
hurdle. In a notably parsimonious restriction of a federal forum, once the 
property owner has pursued her state inverse condemnation claim, issue 
preclusion will almost certainly prevent her from bringing her claim in 
 
162 See 11A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.158 (3d ed. Supp. 
2016) (“[I]n inverse condemnation proceedings, a landowner commences proceedings to recover just 
compensation for a taking or damaging of his property when formal condemnation proceedings have 
not been instituted.” (footnote omitted)); Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 553, 605 (2012) (“[I]nverse-condemnation actions amount to a kind of eminent domain 
proceeding in reverse: they are initiated by the property owner rather than the government, but like 
eminent domain actions, they ask if property has been taken and the government should thus be forced 
to pay.”). 
163 473 U.S. 172, 194–95 (1985). 
164 See Bloom & Serkin, supra note 162, at 605 (describing inverse condemnation). 
165 Id. 
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federal court.166 The result is that all regulatory takings claims against local 
governments begin and end with state inverse condemnation actions.167 
The inverse condemnation exclusion is even broader than it seems 
because some courts have extended its reach to exclude coverage for land 
use litigation, even beyond regulatory takings.168 The typical policy 
exclusion refers to all claims “arising out of” or “in any way connected 
with” inverse condemnation, and so creative pleading by a property owner, 
or creative characterizations of those pleadings by a municipality, are 
unlikely to avoid the breadth of the exclusion.169 For example, in 
Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. City of San Bernardino,170 property 
owners had sued the city for flooding on their property, and had brought 
claims under both inverse condemnation and tort. If either had been 
covered by the City’s insurance, then the insurance company would at least 
have had to defend the City in the litigation.171 The Ninth Circuit, however, 
held that the tort claims were also subject to the inverse condemnation 
exclusion, reasoning that “inverse condemnation and tort are not distinct 
causes, but rather two ways to characterize the same cause of harm.”172 This 
holding is no outlier.173 Some courts have held the exclusion applies to due 
 
166 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 338, 347–48 (2005) (finding 
that issue preclusion applies to Fifth Amendment claim following inverse condemnation action in state 
court). 
167 See Bloom & Serkin, supra note 162, at 605 (“State courts thus get first bite at these actions 
under Williamson County—and they get the only bite under San Remo.”). 
168 See, e.g., N. River Ins. Co. v. Town of Grand Island, No. 93-CV-100S, 1995 WL 250391, at *6 
(W.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 1995) (applying inverse condemnation exclusion to municipality’s prohibition on 
disposal of clay when property owner sued under various theories). In a previous case involving Grand 
Island, River Oaks Marine, Inc. v. Town of Grand Island, 89-CV-1016S, 1992 WL 406813, (W.D.N.Y. 
June 19, 1992), the plaintiff alleged both that the government action imposed a significant economic 
burden and violated the Commerce Clause, among other challenges. N. River Ins. Co., 1995 WL 
250391, at *2–3. The district court in North River held that the inverse condemnation exclusion applied 
to all of the plaintiff’s claims previously made out by the plaintiff in River Oaks. Id. at *8. Thus, the 
insurance company was not liable to provide coverage for the municipality. Id. 
169 See, e.g., Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. V.I. Port Auth., No. 2001-188, 2007 WL 185122, at *5 (V.I. 
Jan. 5, 2007) (“The ‘arising out of’ language suggests that ‘a claim need bear only an incidental 
relationship to the described conduct for the exclusion to apply.’” (quoting Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Clear 
Lake City Water Auth., 229 F. Supp. 2d 668, 697 (S.D. Tex. 2002))); Trumpeter Devs., LLC v. Pierce 
County, 681 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Wis. App. 2004) (“[W]e must look at the incident giving rise to [the 
property owner’s] claim, not the theory of liability.” (citation omitted)); see also Christopher Serkin, 
Strategic Land Use Litigation: Pleading Around Municipal Insurance, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
463 (2016). 
170 No. 88-6590, 1990 WL 20819, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 1990). 
171 See supra notes 153–55 (discussing duty to defend). 
172 Transcon. Ins. Co., 1990 WL 20819, at *1. 
173 Courts have been generous in applying inverse condemnation exclusion. See, e.g., Gen. Star 
Indem. Co., 2007 WL 185122, at *5 (adopting broad reading of exclusion); Trumpeter, 681 N.W.2d at 
271–72 (same). 
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process and equal protection claims,174 and even to Fair Housing Act 
claims, among others.175 
It is not at all obvious why the exclusion should apply so broadly 
because each of these different claims requires developing different factual 
records. The existence of a regulatory taking turns on the property owner’s 
expectations about the use of the property, and the extent to which the 
government’s actions interfered with those expectations.176 Equal 
protection, on the other hand, implicates the government’s justification for 
treating different property owners differently, and the Fair Housing Act 
focuses on the impact of a government action on protected classes.177 Even 
though the elements of these claims are so different, courts have 
nevertheless held that all of them are excluded from coverage as arising out 
of inverse condemnation. The inverse condemnation exclusion may thus go 
much further than precluding insurance for regulatory takings claims, and 
may preclude insurance coverage for any land use litigation. Indeed, a 
handbook addressed to local officials concludes: “As of this writing, the 
authors are not aware of any public agency[, joint powers agency,] or 
insurance carrier willing to provide express coverage for claims resulting 
from land use regulation.”178 
While the breadth of the exclusion varies somewhat by state, it is also 
clear enough that, at a minimum, quintessential regulatory takings claims 
 
174 See, e.g., S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fund v. City of Myrtle Beach, 628 S.E.2d 276, 278–79 (S.C. 
App. 2006) (holding that inverse condemnation exclusion applied to equal protection and due process 
claims arising out of a rule requiring landlords to be secondarily liable for tenants’ water bills). 
175 See Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 229 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2002); 
County of Boise v. Idaho Ctys. Risk Mgmt. Program, 265 P.3d 514, 518 (Idaho 2011); Village of 
Waterford v. Reliance Ins. Co., 640 N.Y.S.2d 671 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). But see City of College 
Station v. Star Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2013); Town of Cumberland v. R.I. Interlocal Risk 
Mgmt. Tr., Inc., 860 A.2d 1210 (R.I. 2004). Other courts have adopted even narrower readings, but 
these are unusual. See City of Collinsville v. Ill. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Ass’n, 904 N.E.2d 70, 75–77 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that inverse condemnation exclusion does not apply to § 1983 claims for 
takings of property); C.V. Perry & Co. v. Village of West Jefferson, 673 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding that property owner’s complaint that denial of building permits was a taking of 
property did not sound in inverse condemnation). For discussion of the impact of these different 
approaches of plaintiffs’ pleading decisions, see Serkin, supra note 169. 
176 See supra note 149 (discussing Penn Central test). 
177 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (defining prohibited conduct under Fair Housing Act); Layne 
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 460 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1983) (setting forth equal protection test for 
discriminatory line drawing). 
178 DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL., CMTY. RIGHTS COUNSEL, TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: 
DEFENDING TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 33 (2000), 
http://communityrights.org/LegalResources/Handbook/HBintro.php [perma.cc/D2A4-T7FX]; see also 
Thomas W. Kelty, Inverse Condemnation: Another Assault upon Municipal Regulation, ILL. MUN. 
REV., Aug. 1986, at 9, 11, http://www.lib.niu.edu/1986/im860809.html [perma.cc/A39Z-HP8R] (“[A]t 
this time it is very difficult for a city to obtain insurance covering inverse condemnation.”). 
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are excluded from municipal insurance coverage in almost every state. The 
one major exception appears to be Minnesota, where the public insurance 
pool administered by the League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust 
(LMCIT) does, in fact, cover regulatory takings claims.179 The LMCIT is 
extremely unusual in providing comprehensive insurance for land use 
litigation of all forms, including claims exclusively for injunctive relief.180 
Indeed, the LMCIT coverage is the exception that proves the rule. Its 
manual singles out for particular mention its coverage for regulatory 
takings claims because it is “frequently excluded under conventional 
liability insurance policies.”181 The Minnesota example also demonstrates 
that such coverage is both possible and valuable—both points taken up in 
Part III. 
Why should we care? Uninsured risks impose some costs on risk 
averse municipal governments, but governing is full of risks. Is it really 
worth getting exercised about this kind of risk, especially when 
conventional wisdom holds that successful regulatory takings claims are 
vanishingly rare? Yes. The problem of uninsured risk of regulatory takings 
may lead to underregulation and may also have distributional consequences 
between local governments. Consider these in turn. 
B. Takings Risk and Regulatory Incentives 
There is little doubt that takings insurance could be very valuable to 
risk averse local governments. For some—like Half Moon Bay—it could 
even prove the difference between life and death.182 But the real value may 
not be in the ex post protection it provides for adverse judgments. After all, 
takings liability is actually quite rare. The primary value, instead, comes 
from the effect on ex ante regulatory incentives. Takings insurance is 
valuable to society generally, which loses when municipalities 
underregulate vis-à-vis their actual preferences because of the risk of 
takings liability.183 Or, to view this from a different baseline, the absence of 
takings insurance creates serious inefficiencies in governments’ regulatory 
incentives. 
 
179 See LMCIT COVERAGE GUIDE, supra note 160, at 3. 
180 Id. at 24. (“Compared to conventional liability insurance, a key difference of the LMCIT 
coverage is that litigation relating to these types of special litigation risks is covered regardless of 
whether the litigation includes a claim for damages.”). 
181 Id. at 26. The other category of coverage the LMCIT provides that conventional insurance 
usually does not extend to is “[a]wards of attorney’s fees in federal civil rights or state human rights 
actions.” Id. 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 10–12. 
183 See Serkin, supra note 14, at 397–98 (discussing local governments’ failure to regulate and 
address sea level rise because of the concern of takings liability). 
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The absence of municipal insurance for regulatory takings claims is 
not just some narrow technical problem but can meaningfully affect local 
decisionmaking. Consider, for example, a municipal legislature deciding 
whether to downzone property in order to preserve open space, or a board 
of zoning appeals deciding whether to deny a subdivision permit for the 
same reason. Municipal officials will have to decide whether the action 
creates more benefits than costs.184 Here, the benefits might be preservation 
of open space and environmental protection, or less salutary goals such as 
exclusion or protectionism.185 On the cost side of the ledger, some are 
quantifiable, such as foregone property tax revenue if development does 
not occur. Some are less concrete, such as the development pressure that 
will increase on other property in the municipality if this particular land is 
downzoned. And some are speculative—or risky—such as the possibility 
of regulatory takings litigation and liability. At a sufficient level of 
generality, the decision facing the municipal officials will be whether the 
regulatory benefits outweigh the costs. It is here that municipal risk 
aversion looms large. 
The possibility of takings litigation has an expected value for the 
municipality, computed by the cost of the liability discounted by its 
probability, plus litigation costs.186 Imagine that the government anticipates 
that a takings claim for the downzoning would cost the government $4 
million, but that it appropriately assesses the likelihood of losing at only 
10%. Leaving aside litigation costs for the sake of simplicity, it is easy 
enough to see how this should affect a risk neutral government’s decision. 
The expected cost of the regulation is $400,000. If the regulation is still 
worth it—if, in other words, the government would be willing to pay 
$400,000 to secure the regulatory benefits—then it should downzone the 
property. But for a risk averse municipal official, a 10% chance of a $4 
million loss will weigh more heavily on the cost side of the ledger. 
Depending on the relative risk aversion, that same regulatory action may 
have an impact on decisionmaking that far outweighs its expected cost, 
perhaps $800,000, $1 million, or more. The effect may be that the 
government forgoes a regulation that, in fact, creates greater benefits than 
costs when rationally calculated. 
 
184 In the context of land use, the due process standard requires some general cost–benefit calculus. 
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS (4th ed. 2013) (citing cases). 
185 Restricting development reduces the supply of new housing. All else being equal, this will tend 
to increase prices and thus reduce affordability. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, 
Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1667, 1667 (2013). 
186 Specifically, it will include litigation costs discounted by the likelihood of being sued, plus any 
ultimate just compensation award again discounted by the probability of losing. 
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At this level of generality, the effect of risk aversion on regulatory 
incentives is straightforward. And it can affect all kinds of government 
decisions—any, in fact, that potentially implicate the Takings Clause. The 
result can be to undervalue the net value of regulatory enactments, such as 
zoning changes, subdivision permits, environmental regulations, and so 
forth. But it can also lead government decisionmakers to underenforce 
existing rules by granting variances or failing to enforce land use 
regulations when an affected property owner threatens to sue. 
Experienced practitioners in the area may well chafe at this claim. 
After all, conventional wisdom suggests that takings claims are extremely 
difficult for property owners to win and so successful claims are rare.187 But 
a developer (or any other adversely affected property owner) does not need 
to win a takings claim to impose substantial costs on a local government. 
The litigation costs associated with defending takings claims can also be 
very high, and so even the need to mount a defense can make local 
governments risk averse. To give a sense of the potential costs, land use 
litigation in Minnesota constitutes approximately 22% of all liability costs, 
85% of which comes from litigation costs.188 To be sure, land use litigation 
is a broader category than taking litigation alone, but recall that in many 
states, the inverse condemnation exclusion applies to both.189 And no matter 
how careful a government may be, it has no significant control over 
whether a property owner will sue. Truly frivolous suits may come with 
Rule 11 sanctions and attorneys fees, but the ad hoc nature of takings 
litigation—discussed in detail below190—again makes it relatively easy for 
property owners to plead a cognizable cause of action. Inverse 
condemnation litigation is a risk that attends many regulatory actions. And 
the problem with municipal risk aversion is that even an unlikely 
 
187 See generally James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2779858## 
[https://perma.cc/8WL3-AGU6]. 
188 Land Use, LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, http://www.lmc.org/page/1/land-use.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/RN7V-N236] (“LMCIT members spend about $2.5 million per year on land use 
claims—about 22 percent of all liability costs. The average cost of a land use claim is $35,000. Of those 
costs, more than 85 percent is spent to cover defense costs. In other words, these claims generally are 
not about paying damages to someone but rather about paying for legal defense of the city.”). An 
insurance pool in North Dakota has an inverse condemnation exclusion with an important and unusual 
addendum. It excludes coverage for: “Liability arising out of or in any way connected with any 
operation of the principles of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings, or ‘inverse condemnation,’ 
by whatever name called. However, this exclusion does not apply to defense, costs, or supplementary 
payments.” Liability Memorandum of Coverage, supra note 160, at 8 (emphasis added). At least the 
members of this pool have recognized the importance of covering litigation costs for regulatory takings 
claims. 
189 See supra text accompanying notes 168–75. 
190 See infra Section III.A. 
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possibility of a successful takings claim can have a disproportionate impact 
on ex ante regulatory incentives.191 
Whether this is a bug or a feature depends on the eye of the beholder. 
Some people are likely to have an intuition that governments should avoid 
doing anything that might conceivably violate the Takings Clause. If the 
threat of uninsured regulatory taking claims means that governments steer 
well clear of actions that might burden property rights, then that is all to the 
good. Indeed, some might object to this whole setup and argue that 
governments should, as a normative matter, internalize the full costs of 
their regulatory actions. Local officials should not discount the costs they 
impose by the likelihood of litigation success. The argument goes: 
whatever the vagaries of takings law, if a government is imposing $4 
million worth of harm, it should fully internalize that cost. Any kind of 
insurance, in this view, would be perverse because it would allow 
governments to ignore regulatory burdens.192 
This argument, however, relies on a base assumption that governments 
should compensate for every regulatory burden they impose. This is a 
principled view, closely associated with Richard Epstein among others, but 
it is most decidedly not the law—nor should it be.193 Professor Epstein 
notwithstanding, takings law and most takings theories recognize that there 
are many costs governments should not be forced to bear.194 If the 
regulatory burden does not go too far or does not interfere too much with 
an owner’s expectations, no compensation is due.195 As Justice Holmes 
 
191 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public, 
45 ENVTL. L 337, 359–60 (2015); Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: Reclaiming an Environmental 
Discourse, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 257 (2007) (“The shrill call of private property rights is heard in 
the halls of almost every agency, every day . . . . This private property rights rhetoric has cowered 
officials at every level of government . . . .”). 
192 This concern is reminiscent of debates over the availability of insurance for punitive damages or 
criminal activity. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT 
LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009); 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409 (2005). Indeed, it is 
reminiscent of debates about whether liability insurance is ever appropriate. See Baker & Siegelman, 
supra note 25, at 5 (describing history of debates). In the tort context, as well, “many scholars share in 
the view that tort law’s deterrence objective is ‘severely, perhaps fatally undermined’ by the prevalence 
of insurance.” Schwartz, supra note 65, at 313 (quoting John G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in 
Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815, 823 (1967)). 
193 See EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 84–85. 
194 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–16 (1967) (arguing that 
compensation should only be required when demoralization costs outweigh settlement costs). 
195 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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observed nearly a century ago, the government could hardly go on if forced 
to compensate for all the regulatory burdens it imposes.196 
Regulatory takings law does not seek to require local governments to 
internalize all the costs of its land use regulations. Therefore, it is entirely 
rational and appropriate for a government to discount the regulatory 
burdens it imposes by the likelihood that it will be found to have triggered 
the compensation requirement. That discounting merely reflects the reality 
of the doctrine and the underlying normative perspective that most 
regulatory burdens should not require compensation. If risk aversion means 
that local governments exaggerate the prospective cost of regulatory 
actions, then governments may end up underregulating relative to the 
choices that a rational, risk neutral government actor would make. As 
argued in Section I.A, the risk of takings litigation could impact regulatory 
incentives whether one focuses on financial or political costs.197 Fiscal costs 
do not have to translate perfectly into political costs for risk aversion to 
affect government decisionmaking. So long as local politicians are averse 
to the political risks imposed by uninsured takings liability, they may 
choose to forego regulations that would, in fact, be beneficial to their 
community. In short, the threat of takings liability can lead to inefficient 
underregulation and underenforcement of land use and environmental 
regulations by risk averse governments. 
C. Distributional Effects of the Inverse Condemnation Exclusion 
In addition to concerns about the willingness of local governments to 
regulate, the absence of insurance may have important distributional 
consequences to consider as well. Because of the ways in which local 
governments spread risk, municipal risk aversion is likely to vary with the 
size and character of the government. Larger and wealthier local 
governments will be closer to risk neutral, while smaller and poorer ones 
more risk averse.198 Therefore, the same regulatory action, with the same 
expected value, is more likely to be adopted by a larger municipality than 
by a smaller one if it includes a risk of takings liability. 
This can give risk neutral local governments a competitive advantage 
over those that fail to create valuable regulatory benefits because of their 
aversion to the risk of regulatory takings litigation and liability. A 
government that rationally calculates costs and benefits and enacts more 
 
196 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could go on if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
general law.”). 
197 See supra Section I.A. 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 34–36. 
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regulations that are net beneficial will—by definition—increase the 
community’s welfare more than those that forego such regulations. This 
still leaves plenty of room for disagreement about what counts as 
regulatory costs and benefits, and which regulations are actually welfare 
enhancing. But the point is simply this: whatever costs and benefits one 
wants to include—whether one favors a minimalist or maximalist 
government or something in between—risk aversion will lead smaller local 
governments to forego regulations with a risk of takings liability that risk 
neutral governments will enact. 
These distributional effects may, in fact, be contributing to the recent 
revitalization and repopulation of cities and the urban core. The claim here 
is both modest and tentative. The factors leading to America’s reinvestment 
in cities are varied and complex.199 Decreases in crime, changes in racial 
attitudes, growing opportunities for agglomeration surplus, and many other 
factors have contributed to the rebirth of a number of American cities in the 
last decades.200 The overall demographic change has received enormous 
attention from political scientists, urban economists, planners, and land use 
practitioners.201 Each offers a different lens for viewing the phenomenon. 
But the role of aversion to the risk of legal liability has not been previously 
identified and offers a promising additional explanation. 
Cities and suburbs have long been in competition with each other over 
residents and mobile capital.202 Until recently, suburbs have won round 
after round, coming close to knockouts in the 1970s and 1980s. They have 
offered more space and newer housing for less money because land values 
 
199 See, e.g., NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY (2010) (focusing on land use and 
policing in urban revitalization); EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY (2011) (describing 
economic reasons for revitalization of cities); WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, MAKESHIFT METROPOLIS (2010) 
(describing role of land use in urban revitalization); see also Morgan Brennan, Downtowns: What’s 
Behind America’s Most Surprising Real Estate Boom, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2013, 12:02 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/morganbrennan/2013/03/25/emerging-downtowns-u-s-cities-revitalizing-
business-districts-to-lure-young-professionals/ [perma.cc/6NUH-PD2Z] (discussing population growth 
among twenty-five to thirty-four year-old college-educated professionals into cities as “one of the 
reasons city planners have been plowing money and resources into revitalizing their core business 
districts”). 
200 See Paul L. Knox & Fang Wei, Neighborhood Change in Metropolitan America, 1990 to 2010, 
50 URB. AFF. REV. 459, 462 (2013). 
201 See, e.g., STACEY A. SUTTON, URBAN REVITALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES (2008), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/c2arl/pdf_files/USURRP_Phase_I_Final_Report.pdf 
[perma.cc/3D5V-AX7R] (discussing the various stakeholders interested in and active in urban 
revitalization). 
202 Cf. Oates, supra note 43, at 958–59 (discussing how the output of public services in the suburbs, 
such as quality of the local public schools, affects choice of residence); Tiebout, supra note 43, at 418 
(discussing that local expenditures are variables that influence an individual’s choice to move to a 
certain municipality). 
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are cheaper where supply is greater.203 They have attracted affluent 
residents by using zoning and other land use controls to maintain relative 
homogeneity in local property values—prohibiting or limiting inexpensive 
housing—thus minimizing the extent of redistribution through property 
taxes.204 And they have promoted and benefitted from substantial 
investments in roads and highways, allowing residents to commute to work 
by car.205 They have, in short, offered a product—a combination of services 
and taxes—that residents seemed to want. The result was a kind of death 
spiral for cities. They hemorrhaged jobs and capital, raising taxes just to 
maintain declining levels of services, which caused more capital flight.206 
Add race and poverty to the mix, and it seemed for a time as though 
suburbs’ ascendance was unstoppable.207 
Cities, however, fought back. And they did so partly through 
regulatory innovations. Responding to policy pressures and changing 
consumer demand, cities in recent years have, in particular, become land 
use innovators. The Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), reflected in 
traditional Euclidean zoning, was based on the premise of separating 
incompatible uses.208 Like a kind of ex ante nuisance prevention, this 
overarching goal propelled and favored development of the traditional 
suburb with its exclusive dedication to single-family residential uses and 
automobile dependence.209 That paradigm dominated land use for the better 
(or worse) part of the twentieth century. But cities have embraced new 
paradigms, such as mixed-use developments with ground-level commercial 
spaces and residences on higher levels, new urbanism that favors 
walkability and seeks to replicate traditional town centers on a sublocal 
scale, transit-oriented development with greater density around transit hubs 
 
203 See, e.g., Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization, 
7 J. ECON. PERSP. 135, 136 (1993). 
204 See generally Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization 
and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1210 (2008). 
205 See Andrew F. Haughwout, The Paradox of Infrastructure Investment: Can a Productive Good 
Reduce Productivity?, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 2000, at 40, 42. 
206 See James A. Kushner, Urban Neighborhood Regeneration and the Phases of Community 
Evolution After World War II in the United States, 41 IND. L. REV. 575, 581–82 (2008). But see 
FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 152–54 (challenging death spiral narrative). 
207 Kushner, supra note 206 at 583–84. 
208 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning against 
facial due process challenge on grounds that separating incompatible uses is an appropriate use of the 
police power). 
209 Cf. Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey, Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land Use 
Controls, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 305 (2013) (describing original goal of zoning as separating residential 
districts from industrial and commercial ones). 
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and density limits elsewhere, and form-based codes that focus on buildings’ 
form instead of permissible uses at all.210 
As demand among housing consumers for city living has increased, 
cities have leveraged their land use authority to manage growth while 
extracting value from developers. Most generally, cities have slowly 
reformed their response to development pressures. Conventional wisdom 
holds that cities are growth machines, in the thrall and political control of 
development interests—builders, construction workers, realtors, bankers, 
and so forth.211 Today, however, cities have been more aggressively seeking 
to capture some of the value created by new development instead of 
leaving that value entirely in private hands.212 Exactions and required 
dedications are the most obvious examples. But incentive zoning that gives 
height or density bonuses for certain concessions has the same effect by 
encouraging private developers to provide public benefits.213 City zoning 
ordinances create many bargaining moments when municipalities offer 
regulatory concessions in exchange for public benefits, such as new parks, 
schools, infrastructure, and so forth. 
More specifically, cities have found new ways to attract and retain 
mobile capital by protecting property values in affluent neighborhoods. 
Suburbs are long practiced in this art, using large-lot zoning and holding 
zones to restrict supply.214 Those same tools are not appropriate to the dense 
urban core so cities have been developing their own modern techniques 
aimed at protecting and enhancing local property values.215 Historic 
preservation, for example, has become an important tool for sublocal 
 
210 See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Leaps and Bounds, 108 MICH. L. REV. 957, 962 (2010); 
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (2013) 
(describing adoption of new form-based codes). 
211 See, e.g., Vicki Been et al., Urban Land Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the 
Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 228–29 (2014) (characterizing traditional views 
of local governments). 
212 See Schragger, supra note 43, at 508–12 (describing the increasing “conditions on mobile 
capital” that cities use in their land use processes); see also Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2728417 [https://perma.cc/Q7RV-KMD8] (describing recent decision by New York City to rezone 
property in exchange for public benefits, but thereby adversely affecting the value of private 
transferable development rights). 
213 See Serkin, supra note 212 (describing zoning ordinance in New York City requiring developer 
to pay for certain infrastructure improvements in order to receive density bonus). 
214 See Serkin & Wellington, supra note 185, at 1671 (“Large-lot zoning was ubiquitous across 
suburbs that developed around major cities like New York and Saint Louis. In fact, in the late 1960s, 
Missouri had a four-year supply of one-third acre lots, but a stunning 350-year supply of one-acre lots.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
215 Id. at 1685–86 (contrasting new urban efforts to exclude the poor with more conventional 
suburban ones). 
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neighborhoods to slow or stop new development and protect property 
values. That is not, of course, the purpose of historic preservation, but it is 
often its effect, as local property owners well understand.216 Some cities 
have begun authorizing “neighborhood conservation districts,” which do 
not even use the pretense of historic significance to protect certain 
neighborhoods from development pressure.217 
Downzoning upscale neighborhoods, implementing noncumulative 
industrial zones, and imposing steep exactions all limit opportunities for 
new residential development. All of these techniques, and others, have the 
effect of limiting or eliminating the development potential of great swaths 
of urban land, thus reducing supply and increasing property values to the 
benefit of in-place property owners.218 
Simultaneously, cities have found ways to incentivize higher end 
development, catering increasingly to development proposals that include 
luxury housing, high-end retail, and upscale commercial space. For 
developments like these, cities will grant upzonings, issue needed permits, 
assemble land using eminent domain, develop infrastructure, create 
transferable development rights, and even grant tax abatements. Cities have 
always sought to attract mobile capital, but they have new opportunities to 
do so and have used land use tools to gain an advantage over their suburban 
competitors, often over the objections of neighbors who face increased 
congestion and dislocation caused by gentrification.219 
These have become well-honed tools in a municipal government’s 
regulatory toolkit. Some are in conflict with each other, and not all are 
available in all instances. Nevertheless, it is clear enough that the overall 
nature of land use regulations in the urban core has shifted quite 
dramatically from the static version of zoning reflected in the SZEA. And 
in the overall balance of power between private property and regulatory 
 
216 See David A. Lewis, Identifying and Avoiding Conflicts Between Historic Preservation and the 
Development of Renewable Energy, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 274, 289 (2015) (“Preserved and restored 
historic resources can be a competitive advantage for cities and towns and rural areas alike. Examples 
abound of towns and cities using historic preservation as a strategy in developing local economic 
activity.” (footnotes omitted)). 
217 William A. Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: The New Belt and Suspenders of 
Municipal Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339, 340 (2013) (describing the phenomenon). 
218 See FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, HOW HAVE RECENT REZONINGS 
AFFECTED THE CITY’S ABILITY TO GROW? 7–10 (2010), http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/
Rezonings_Furman_Center_Policy_Brief_March_2010.pdf [perma.cc/QHB2-HAWH]. 
219 See, e.g., Andy Newman, Clearing of Atlantic Yards’ Site Proceeds as Legal Thicket Grows 
Denser, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/nyregion/05yards.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/V32W-PYB8] (describing opposition to Atlantic Yards development in Brooklyn). 
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control, these changes all tilt towards increased governmental power and 
intervention in land development decisions.220 
All of these regulatory innovations also implicate the Takings Clause. 
Where regulatory burdens are too restrictive, or where governments seek to 
extract too much value, property owners and developers can allege a 
regulatory taking. Most of these programs and regulatory approaches 
should and will survive takings scrutiny, but they are at least open to 
challenge. They therefore represent some risk, however small, of takings 
liability. These kinds of regulatory approaches, that extract value from 
developers and that favor the public over private interests, are therefore 
more valuable to less risk averse governments. Relative to suburbs and 
rural towns, cities will be more willing to adopt regulations that burden 
private property rights. The lack of insurance for regulatory takings liability 
offers one explanation why cities have been at the forefront of these 
innovations.221 
For people who decry these trends—who see cities as inappropriately 
bleeding off profits from private developers—the relative risk aversion of 
suburbs and towns may seem like welcome relief. Of course, developers 
themselves may feel this way and flee the cities if public demands grow too 
high. The point here, though, is not to defend the appropriateness or 
desirability of different regulatory approaches. The insight, instead, is that 
risk aversion will affect different local governments’ willingness to 
experiment with these and other land use regulations unevenly. It will 
impede suburban more than urban experimentation. Whatever one’s view 
of the appropriate level of land use innovation, the disparity in these effects 
of risk aversion on regulatory incentives seems entirely haphazard and 
unprincipled. 
In theory, it should be possible to test this claim about relative levels 
of urban and suburban land use innovation empirically. Such a test would 
be an article unto itself, however, and must therefore be reserved for future 
work. Impressionistically, though, the intuition is borne out in practice: the 
larger the municipality, the more complex the regulatory apparatus is that 
controls development and property rights. And there is some empirical 
 
220 See Serkin & Macey, supra note 209, at 315–16 (describing expansion of permissible goals of 
zoning and means of accomplishing them). 
221 There are, of course, exceptions. Some smaller local governments with particular political 
identities have been equally, if not, more active. Boulder, Colorado, comes immediately to mind. 
Moreover, there are other more immediate reasons why cities may have been more aggressive in 
adopting regulatory innovations. Because they have been faced with greater development pressures, and 
also face greater congestion of public resources, it is no surprise that cities perceive an acute interest in 
land use regulations. The claim here is simply that risk aversion supports these natural trends. 
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support for this claim.222 Of course, it may be the case that cities regulate 
more because they have more property conflicts to manage, or because they 
tend to be politically more liberal than suburbs. Causation, in other words, 
is difficult to impute. Nevertheless, available empirical evidence is at least 
consistent with the idea that less risk neutral governments in general 
regulate more than risk averse ones. 
If this is right, and relative risk aversion has given cities a competitive 
edge over suburbs and smaller governments, then the end result may be 
desirable if the return to cities generates positive economic, social, and 
environmental benefits. But to the extent that the risk of regulatory takings 
liability puts a thumb on the scale in government decisionmaking, its 
weight varies haphazardly and irrationally with the size of the municipality. 
The risk of uninsured regulatory takings liability is not evenly distributed, 
and that means that regulatory incentives may vary with the size and wealth 
of the government. For those who embrace cities’ resurgence, the absence 
of takings insurance is still a problem.223 There are more direct ways to give 
them a competitive advantage instead of hobbling smaller governments’ 
incentives to regulate rationally. 
III. ADDRESSING THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION EXCLUSION 
If the absence of municipal liability insurance imposes all of the costs 
identified above, why does takings insurance not already exist? If coverage 
were actually so valuable, municipalities would want it, and insurance 
companies should be offering it already. The fact that they do not means 
either that there is some impediment to its development in the market, or 
that it is not actually as valuable as this Article claims. This Part explores 
those possibilities and, after identifying and refuting some of the reasons 
for the absence of takings insurance, argues that states should subsidize 
certain kinds of regulatory actions by insuring against any resulting 
litigation. 
 
222 Cf. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Is Manhattan So Expensive?: Regulation and the Rise in 
Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 359 (2005) (calculating zoning “tax” for a sample of 
municipalities across the country, and reporting in general that the largest cities have the highest “tax”). 
223 It is possible, however, that insurers would also find ways to constrain the regulatory 
innovations of insured municipalities. Cf. Rappaport, supra note 9, at 63 (discussing ways in which 
insurance companies limit the risks created by police departments in order to reduce the companies’ 
exposure to legal liability). If that is true, then insurance will not necessarily invite greater land use 
experimentation. 
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A. Explaining the Inverse Condemnation Exclusion 
Why is there no municipal insurance for regulatory takings claims? It 
cannot simply be that insurance is unavailable for the policy decisions of 
municipal officials because that is precisely what E&O insurance covers. 
Nor do regulatory takings claims arise exclusively out of broad regulatory 
enactments. Permit denials by individual zoning administrators or boards 
can generate takings claims, and they are difficult to distinguish from the 
kinds of employment decisions or misconduct by municipal officials that 
are routinely insurable. There are some likely reasons for the absence of 
takings insurance, but they are only satisfying in conjunction with each 
other; there is no single explanation. 
One significant reason for the inverse condemnation exclusion may 
be, quite simply, a misunderstanding on the part of insurers and municipal 
officials alike about the nature of regulatory takings claims.224 Tellingly, the 
relevant policy language excludes insurance for both condemnation and 
inverse condemnation claims.225 The absence of insurance for the former is 
entirely straightforward. Condemnation—eminent domain—is not a 
“fortuitous” event, and therefore does not represent an insurable loss.226 The 
existence and extent of the loss are entirely within the control of the 
government. If a government wants to avoid paying compensation for 
condemnation, it can choose simply not to take the property. If it wants to 
pay less, it can take less expensive property. While a government incurs 
costs when it takes property by eminent domain, there is no risk and 
therefore no role for insurance.227 
 
224 Today, some firms—like Glatfelter and Alliant—specialize in public insurance. See, e.g., Public 
Entity Insurance Solutions, ALLIANT, http://www.alliant.com/Industry-Solutions/Public-Entity/Pages/
default.aspx [http://perma.cc/8GRC-8BFH]; GLATFELTER, http://www.glatfelterpublicpractice.com 
[https://perma.cc/V94K-VKZC]. However, insurance companies have, in the past, failed to understand 
the nature of municipal risk. See, e.g., Jaron, supra note 63, at 20 (“[I]nsurance companies do not 
understand state and local government. Few, if any, insurance firms treat government as a specialty; 
instead, they have been add-ons to other lines designed for the private sector.” (first citing NAT’L 
LEAGUE OF CITIES, THE NEW WORLD OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY 4–5 (1978); and then citing OKLA. 
MUN. LEAGUE, MUCH ADO ABOUT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY 3–6 (1977))). 
225 See supra note 161 (quoting standard policy language). 
226 Schwartz, supra note 65, at 341 n.125. This is the justification for liability policies’ exclusions 
for intentional harms. See id. at 341 (“Insurance policies typically contain an exclusion for ‘intentional’ 
harms, and the standard explanation for this exclusion is that intentional harms are under the control of 
the insured in a way that makes insurance inadvisable.” (citing ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: 
BASIC TEXT 286–87, 292–93, 297–98 (1971))). 
227 This statement is too strong in some jurisdictions. New York City, for example, allows a 
property owner to compel the government to complete a condemnation that it has initiated. This can 
create genuine risk because the government might file a petition for condemnation based on a faulty 
assessment of value. There is a chance that the condemnation will end up costing the government much 
more than it anticipated, and the government may not be allowed to reverse course and give up on the 
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The same might seem to be true for regulatory takings as well. If the 
government wants to avoid paying compensation, it can choose not to 
regulate. But the analogy is inapt. Inverse condemnation is in many 
respects less like eminent domain than it is like a car crash or other 
accident. While the government undoubtedly intended to enact the relevant 
regulation, in most cases it will not have intended to violate the Takings 
Clause.228 The problem from a municipality’s perspective is that the 
standards for determining takings liability are notoriously vague.229 This is 
an area of law rife with legal uncertainty—precisely the conditions under 
which liability insurance is particularly valuable.230 As a result, land use 
regulations come with genuine risk for the government of both litigation 
and liability. 
Nor can a municipality avoid takings litigation by choosing not to 
regulate. In many cases, property owners sue when a planning commission 
fails to grant a rezoning request.231 A planning commission or zoning board 
can therefore find itself in a particular bind. If it denies the rezoning 
request, the property owner might sue. But if it grants the rezoning request, 
neighbors might sue for a taking of their property, or under due process or 
other challenge to the favorable treatment of neighboring property. This 
catch-22 dynamic means that local governments are faced with genuine 
risk in their land use decisions. Just like you cannot drive a car without 
incurring some risk of an accident, a municipality cannot administer a land 
use regime without some risk of takings litigation and liability.232 Facile 
comparisons to the eminent domain exclusion in municipal insurance 
policies therefore do not explain the exclusion for inverse condemnation. 
Importantly, too, the Constitution requires a damages remedy—i.e., an 
inverse condemnation action—for takings violations.233 In other words, 
 
condemnation. This is unusual, however, and the risk facing the government in eminent domain 
proceedings is therefore quite slight. 
228 This dynamic generally will not preclude insurance coverage. See, e.g., Calvert Ins. Co. v. W. 
Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Even an intentional act will be covered under the policy 
language at issue here if it causes an unexpected and unintended result.”). 
229 See supra note 149 (discussing Penn Central test). 
230 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 65, at 345 (arguing that tort defendants purchase insurance 
because they cannot necessarily avoid harm simply by taking care). As Schwartz argues: 
The combination . . . of the costs of defending against unmeritorious suits, the costs of being 
subjected to liability when the jury errs, and the chance of bearing liability when there is genuine 
uncertainty in the negligence standard provides an explanation for why many defendants . . . 
purchase negligence liability insurance [instead of simply taking care to avoid negligence]. 
Id. at 346. 
231 See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 471 (Fla. 1993). 
232 Thank you to Lee Fennell for this formulation. 
233 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304 (1987) (requiring compensation as remedy for takings violation). 
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regulatory takings claims necessarily create a risk of financial loss for a 
municipality. A local government cannot control its exposure through 
sovereign immunity because local governments are not considered an arm 
of the state and are not entitled to sovereign immunity.234 And if they were 
entitled to sovereign immunity, the Takings Clause itself directly abrogates 
it.235 Moreover, even if a local government changes or withdraws a 
challenged regulation after a court finds it to be a taking, the government is 
still obligated to pay damages for the time that the regulation was in 
effect.236 Measuring those damages can be quite complex, but the overall 
standard is the diminution in value during the time the regulation was in 
effect (sometimes measured by fair rental value).237 If the regulatory harm 
is irrevocable or the regulation remains in place, permanent damages are 
the only remedy available, measured by the fair market value of the 
property taken.238 Regulatory takings therefore are not like eminent domain: 
municipalities face real risk with regards to liability, precisely the kind of 
risk that insurance could but does not cover. The inverse condemnation 
exclusion cannot be explained by the absence of genuine risk. 
There is another constellation of explanations: moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and information asymmetries. The moral hazard problem is the 
most obvious and the most significant. The concern is that the presence of 
insurance may induce local governments to discount risks of regulatory 
takings litigation that they should, in fact, internalize. A zoning board or 
planning commission might risk coming closer to the constitutional line if 
it knows that any resulting litigation will be covered by insurance. This, in 
turn, makes the risk difficult to insure because the existence of insurance 
will make the insured more likely to incur the covered loss. 
 
234 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (holding that municipalities can be 
liable for § 1983 violations). This has been defended on normative and doctrinal grounds. See Melvyn 
R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 577 (1994). 
235 See First English, 482 U.S. at 316 n.9. For a view that sovereign immunity might extend to 
municipal governments, but that the Takings Clause nevertheless abrogates state sovereign immunity, 
see Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH & LEE 
L. REV. 493, 501 n.18 (2006). But see generally Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign 
Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067 (2001) (arguing that First English did not hold that the Takings 
Clause abrogates state sovereign immunity, and that it does so only when states are sued in state court). 
236 See First English, 482 U.S. at 321; see also Resource Investments, Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. 
Cl. 447, 480–85 (2009) (distinguishing between prospective and retrospective temporary takings). 
237 See Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and Unresolved 
Questions, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 480 (2010); J. Margaret Tretbar, Comment, Calculating 
Compensation for Temporary Regulatory Takings, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 201, 219 (1993). 
238 The Half Moon Bay litigation described in the introduction is one such case. See supra text 
accompanying notes 10–12 (discussing the litigation). 
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This is a serious concern. But this same problem is common to many 
different contexts implicating municipal liability where insurance already 
exists. There is no greater moral hazard problem associated with regulatory 
takings than with other insurable municipal risks, like police misconduct, 
employment discrimination, or automobile accidents. In these cases, too, a 
municipality might exercise too little care in the selection and training of 
police, in the imposition of employment criteria, or in controlling driving 
by municipal employees, and yet insurance is generally available for such 
risks.239 
It is tempting to try to distinguish these contexts from regulatory 
takings. At least some of them—police misconduct for example—do not 
involve municipal policy but instead an agent for the municipality taking 
some rogue action.240 The analogue to regulatory takings is not whether an 
individual police officer will disregard the risk of civil liability because of 
her insurance coverage (the classic moral hazard problem),241 but whether 
municipalities will fail to implement policies and practices to deter police 
misconduct because of the municipality’s coverage. In this way, it may 
seem easier for insurers to monitor police officers and thereby link 
premiums to care.242 In other words, police policies are mediated through 
the conduct of individual officers in a way that seems distinguishable from 
zoning regulations. The moral hazard problem in these other contexts might 
seem less acute.243 
But this cannot be right, or at least does not describe a categorical 
difference between these different contexts. After all, regulatory takings 
claims, like the downzoning of property, can arise directly from legislative 
decisions. But they can also arise from the denial of a subdivision permit 
by the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), the designation of property for 
 
239 See, e.g., Durham City Bd. of Educ. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 426 S.E.2d 451 
(N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 431 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. 1993) (requiring insurer to indemnify school board 
for negligent supervision arising out of alleged rape by basketball coach); Bd. of Pub. Educ. of Sch. 
Dist. of Pittsburgh v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 709 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) 
(finding insurer had duty to defend school district and related defendants in claim involving sexual 
misconduct by employee). 
240 For a discussion of the role of insurance in police misconduct cases, see Rappaport, supra note 
9. 
241 See, e.g., Emery & Maazel, supra note 65, at 590 (describing lack of deterrent effect of civil 
judgments against police because of indemnification); see also Schwartz, supra note 63, at 912 
(discussing practice of police indemnification). 
242 See Rappaport, supra note 9. 
243 Cf. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 42, at 59 (“[T]he lower the level of which the loss-creating 
behavior occurs in a corporation, the less reactive that risk is to the presence . . . of insurance . . . . 
Lower level employees benefit less directly from the insurance, and the corporation has more ways to 
discipline them.”). 
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historic protection by a preservation committee, or other discretionary 
action by a zoning official.244 Such decisions also amount to a kind of 
mediated implementation of municipal policy, where there is a possible 
disconnect between the policymakers of the city council or other legislative 
body, and the people or agencies tasked with implementing it. The analogy 
therefore can be quite apt: instead of the police beating someone up, the 
BZA or other zoning official is roughing up someone’s property. 
The distinction breaks down from the other direction too because 
other insured losses are difficult to distinguish from legislative zoning 
decisions. If a municipality, for example, adopts discriminatory hiring 
policies—like requiring credit checks that systematically discriminate 
against minorities, or physical tests that discriminate against women—any 
resulting litigation will almost certainly trigger the government’s E&O 
policy.245 An Oregon court, for example, upheld a school district’s claims 
against its insurance carrier, seeking indemnification for settlements it 
reached in a series of discrimination claims over its hiring practices.246 The 
court distinguished between discrimination claims alleging disparate 
impact and those alleging intentional discrimination. The insured’s E&O 
policy covered the former because any resulting liability could be 
considered the result of “negligent acts, errors or omissions under the 
policy.”247 It would not cover the latter, however, because an element of 
such claims is that the injury was intended.248 
Regulatory takings do not require a showing of intentional harm. 
Rather, they are more closely analogous to disparate impact claims, where 
an otherwise permissible regulation imposes too significant a burden on an 
individual property owner. Intent is simply not relevant to the takings 
 
244 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (evaluating 
application of historic preservation law for takings violation); New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 
873 F. Supp. 633, 635 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d, 95 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1996) (takings claim arising out 
of rezoning property); Alachua Land Inv’rs, LLC v. City of Gainesville, 107 So. 3d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (takings claim arising out of denial of plat approval); City of Sherman v. Wayne, 
266 S.W.3d 34, 40 (Tex. App. 2008) (takings claim arising out of enforcement of zoning requirement). 
245 See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576, 579 
(Minn. 1994) (requiring insurer to indemnify school board for employment discrimination, and 
rejecting claim that E&O policy should cover only negligence); Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Union v. N.J. 
Sch. Bds. Ass’n Ins. Grp., 719 A.2d 645, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding that E&O 
policy “patently” covered claims for denial of educational services under Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act). 
246 Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Mission Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). 
247 Id. at 936. 
248 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
126 
inquiry.249 In short, there is no conceptual difference between the moral 
hazard problem that attaches to insurance for regulatory takings and for 
claims of employment discrimination, or many other sources of municipal 
liability. 
Looking outside the municipal context reinforces the intuition. E&O 
policies bear a very close resemblance to Directors and Officer (D&O) 
policies, which shield corporate management “from almost all liability-
related costs arising out of any wrongful acts alleged to have been 
committed in the course of their duties.”250 Like municipal insurance, D&O 
policies appear to present a serious moral hazard problem.251 But that 
insurance product nevertheless exists and is, in fact, ubiquitous. 
Insurers have developed sophisticated ways of mitigating moral 
hazard problems in these and other areas.252 As Professor John Rappaport 
has recently explained, insurers limit moral hazard for police misconduct—
pricing premiums for the appropriate level of care—by shaping police 
department policies, engaging in education and trainings, and auditing 
police practices.253 The same can be done in the context of land use 
regulation. Indeed, the League of Minnesota Cities, which appears to be the 
one municipal insurance pool that insures takings litigation, provides a 
similar set of resources and training for local zoning and land use 
officials.254 It offers telephone consultations, written guidance, and online 
training.255 There is nothing inherent in the land use process that would 
prevent insurance companies from adopting the same kinds of monitoring 
and loss-prevention techniques that they apply to the police. 
Insurance companies can also structure their policies to minimize 
moral hazard. They may write policies with large deductibles, or policies 
with both a low ceiling and tall floor of coverage, effectively insuring only 
 
249 Cf. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 529 (2005) (holding that takings claims are 
concerned exclusively with the impact of the regulation on the plaintiff’s property rights and not with 
governmental purpose). 
250 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 42, at 45. 
251 Id. at 60–61 (discussing moral hazard in D&O policies). 
252 See, e.g., Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 169–70 (“[I]nsurance contracts contain 
numerous structural features designed to limit moral hazard. These features seem to work reasonably 
well.”). 
253 See Rappaport, supra note 9, at 36–50 (surveying loss prevention tools). 
254 Land Use, supra note 188 (“LMCIT’s team of land use attorneys works with members to 
provide customized information and training, and acts as a resource to elected and appointed city 
officials and to city attorneys. Land use loss control staff addresses topics including the different roles 
elected officials must play in making land use decisions . . . .”). 
255 See, e.g., Training and Services, LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, http://www.lmc.org/page/1/
LandUseServices.jsp [https://perma.cc/5YZB-JL3C] (describing range of land use resources available 
to “elected officials, city managers, attorneys, and zoning administrators”). 
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the middle tranche of liability.256 These terms mean that the insured has 
“skin in the game” and retains an incentive to avoid a loss.257 Insurers may 
also price their policies according to relatively fine-grained assessments of 
local decisionmaking, evaluating the risk management practices in place 
that are designed to mitigate losses ex ante.258 Here, though, municipal 
liability insurance for takings claims runs into additional problems: adverse 
selection and information asymmetries.259 
Adverse selection occurs when, for example, the worst drivers or the 
sickest people are more likely to purchase the relevant insurance.260 This 
can force the safest drivers and healthiest people out of the insurance pool 
because they are, in effect, cross-subsidizing the higher risk policyholders. 
The result is an insurance death spiral as the average risk in the pool 
increases.261 The same is true of municipalities. It may be that only those 
governments that perceive a genuine risk of takings litigation would be 
likely to purchase the insurance.262 Their perception of risk would be based 
on some combination of the regulatory environment and the litigiousness of 
local developers. 
Insurance companies can address both adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems with better information and more fine-grained risk ratings 
or experience ratings.263 Charging worse drivers more, for example, will 
reduce the extent of the cross-subsidy in the insurance pool. It will also 
 
256 See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 42, at 61 (“As a result of . . . deductibles and limits, 
insurance protection is incomplete, maintaining at least some incentive to prevent loss.”). 
257 See id.; see also Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 169–70 (describing these responses to 
moral hazard). 
258 Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 178 (listing different ways of addressing moral hazard, 
including underwriting, experience rating, coverage design, and loss control, among others). 
259 These are closely related concepts. See French, supra note 150, at 11 (Adverse selection may 
occur when “policyholders have an informational advantage over insurers, which enables the 
policyholders to use that informational advantage to allow people who know they are bad risks to buy 
more insurance than people who are good risks.” (footnote omitted)). 
260 See, e.g., Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1223 (“The phrase ‘adverse selection’ was originally 
coined by insurers to describe the process by which insureds [sic] utilize private knowledge of their 
own riskiness when deciding to buy or forgo insurance.” (footnote omitted)). 
261 See e.g., id. at 1224 (“As the good risks begin to exit, the average quality of those insureds [sic] 
remaining falls and prices rise in a vicious circle, ending in a so-called ‘death spiral’ where no one is 
covered.” (footnote omitted)). 
262 At least one commentator has pointed to adverse selection as one reason why insurance markets 
hardened in the 1980s, exacerbating fluctuations in insurance markets. See Winter, supra note 53, at 
130. 
263 The two concepts are distinct but very similar. Risk rating differentiates people based on ex ante 
assessments of risk categories. “Experience rating is the insurance term for charging different prices 
based on past experience. It is a form of risk classification because past experience is used to predict 
future risk.” TOM BAKER, CONTAINING THE PROMISE OF INSURANCE: ADVERSE SELECTION AND RISK 
CLASSIFICATION, in RISK & MORALITY 271 (Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003). 
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force municipalities to internalize some of the risk of their decisions, thus 
limiting moral hazard.264 For takings claims, however, the fact that a 
municipality has not been sued in the past may provide little information 
about the likelihood of takings litigation in the future.265 Municipal 
elections that result in (or reflect) changed attitudes toward land use 
regulation, different personnel on the planning commission or board of 
zoning appeals, or newly emerging development pressures, can all create 
discontinuities in the risks of takings litigation. 
To some extent, these problems are mitigated by claims-made 
policies, where insurance covers only claims made during the policy period 
based on conduct in the past. But for many regulatory actions, both the 
underlying act and the resulting litigation will both occur during the policy 
period. An insurer cannot price the policy, then, by looking only at a 
municipality’s history of regulating. Moreover, the kinds of factors that 
make takings litigation more or less likely in a particular municipality are 
going to be relatively inscrutable to an insurer. The information 
asymmetries between the municipality and insurer leave plenty of 
opportunities for adverse selection.266 
Nevertheless, the law of large numbers is a powerful tool. So long as 
the risk pool is large enough, an insurer’s actuarial expertise should be able 
to overcome heterogeneous local conditions and informational 
asymmetries, especially if regulatory takings is just one of many risks 
covered.267 And again, there is nothing unique in this regard about takings 
liability. A municipality that hires new police officers or adopts new tough-
on-crime policies may also create discontinuities in the risk of § 1983 
litigation, but insurance markets have overcome those. 
Ultimately, Minnesota’s unusual coverage demonstrates that it is 
possible to create insurance for regulatory takings claims.268 The structure 
of that insurance provides a real-world example of how an insurer can 
 
264 See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 179 (“Experience-rating has the potential to reduce 
both ex ante and ex post moral hazard.”). 
265 Information is key to the adverse selection problem. See Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1223. 
266 See, e.g., Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics 
in Pictures, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 118 (2011) (“When the individual-specific loss probability (or 
expected cost) is private information to the individual, firms must offer a single price for pools of 
observationally identical but in fact heterogeneous individuals.”). 
267 Cf. Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1225 (“[W]hile adverse selection in insurance markets is 
clearly a possibility, it is often not the serious problem that it is taken to be.”). For an argument that 
bundling different coverage together minimizes adverse selection, see French, supra note 150, at 11 
(“The risk of adverse selection diminishes . . . if all of the most common types of risk of loss are 
bundled together in the same policy.”). 
268 See LMCIT COVERAGE GUIDE, supra note 160, at 26. 
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address moral hazard and adverse selection problems for land use litigation 
more broadly. First, the insurance comes with substantial co-pays, and an 
aggregate limit of $1 million annually.269 Moreover, the co-pays in 
Minnesota are based on a sliding scale that includes whether or not 
municipal officials have participated in a land use training program 
designed to minimize the risk of legal liability.270 Finally, the cost of 
municipal insurance through the Minnesota insurance pool is experience 
rated, and land use litigation is factored heavily into that rating.271 
Therefore, municipalities participating in the pool retain some of the risk of 
takings liability, even with the insurance that the pool provides. 
It is therefore clear enough that municipal insurance for takings 
litigation is, in fact, available, and could be made available much more 
widely. The reality, of course, is that such insurance is note widely 
available outside of Minnesota. The gap, then, may come from the demand 
side instead of the supply side. Perhaps regulatory takings are not salient 
enough to justify seeking insurance.272 
To the contrary, while the risk of takings litigation is low, and the risk 
of ultimate liability more remote still, the costs when such losses occur can 
be very, very high. These are the conditions under which insurance can 
thrive.273 And if costs are truly unlikely, then the insurance will be 
inexpensive to purchase. Of course, the infrequency of takings litigation 
may pose an additional challenge if local officials are generally unaware of 
the risk. They will not seek insurance for risks that they have not 
contemplated. Takings litigation is not that rare, however.274 And 
developers and property owners threaten to sue more often than they 
actually do.275 An empirical study demonstrated that planners had fairly 
detailed knowledge of changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence in just one 
 
269 Id. at 5, 27 (setting out aggregate limits and co-pays). 
270 Telephone Interview with Jed Burkett, Loss Control, Minn. League of Cities (Nov. 19, 2015). 
271 Id. 
272 In one recent study, the broader category of “[p]ublic official liability” was near the bottom in 
terms of both frequency and cost of claims. See Qiao, supra note 8, at 43. 
273 See Susan K. Laury et al., Insurance Decisions for Low-Probability Losses, 39 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 17, 18 (2009) (“[I]ndividuals are more likely to purchase insurance for the higher-
consequence, lower-probability events.”); supra Section I.A (discussing loss aversion and the role of 
insurance). But see, e.g., Mark J. Browne et al., Behavioral Bias and the Demand for Bicycle and Flood 
Insurance, 50 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141 (2015) (finding that consumers prefer to buy insurance for 
high probability but low salience events). Thank you to John Rappaport for pointing me to these 
sources. 
274 See Krier & Sterk, supra note 187 (analyzing takings claims over five-year period); see also 
supra note 188 (describing that land use litigation in Minnesota accounts for fully 22% of all municipal 
liability). 
275 See Wood, supra note 191 (describing developers’ threats of takings litigation). 
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specific area of takings law.276 Presumably, general knowledge of the 
possibility of takings liability is much broader. 
Why, then, is regulatory takings insurance still generally unavailable 
to most municipalities? The explanation likely involves a combination of 
moral hazard, adverse selection, and misunderstandings about the nature of 
regulatory takings liability. It may also be that insurance companies have 
little incentive to innovate in this space. Anecdotally at least, competition 
for municipal insurance policies often does not turn on the quality of the 
coverage provided. Instead, local officials tend to select the policy that is 
either cheapest or that is being sold by friends or political allies.277 As a 
result, insurance companies may invest less in identifying and plugging 
holes in municipal insurance than they would in other kinds of insurance 
products.278 All of this means that the absence of takings insurance does not 
undercut the claim that such insurance would be valuable. Instead, it may 
reflect specific impediments to the development of a market for such 
insurance products. 
This could all be written off as an odd but inconsequential lacunae in 
municipal risk management if the stakes were not so high. Ultimately, the 
inverse condemnation exclusion is important not because of inefficiencies 
in insurance markets but because it profoundly affects local governments’ 
regulatory incentives. And this then places municipal risk management 
back squarely into the center of core regulatory takings doctrine and theory. 
B. State Insurance as Municipal Subsidy 
The argument so far has been that regulatory takings insurance could 
exist and the focus has been primarily on the problem of risk averse local 
governments underregulating because of the risk of takings litigation and 
liability. But as the discussion of moral hazard revealed, insurance can also 
allow governments to ignore risks that they should, in fact, internalize.279 
That is, the expected value of regulatory takings claims can loom too large 
 
276 Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s Takings 
Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 116 (2001) (“The 
responses showed that California planners have a high awareness of the cases, particularly of Nollan 
and Dolan, the two cases that most directly affect their every day practice.”). 
277 Cf. Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 1072, 1094 (2010) (“If the consumer supposes that all insurers are pretty much the same and are 
all selling the same basic product, the question dwindles to ‘How much?’”). 
278 That does not explain why public insurance pools outside Minnesota have not stepped in to fill 
the gap. If regulatory takings claims really were insurable, and if there really were demand, then at least 
such insurance should be available through municipal insurance pools. But the inverse condemnation 
exclusion is ubiquitous there, too. 
279 See supra text accompanying note 192. 
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in the absence of insurance, but can appear too small if insurance is 
available, leading to overregulation. 
There may be a private solution to this Goldilocks problem. And if the 
absence of takings insurance is attributable simply to the market’s 
misunderstanding of the nature of regulatory takings claims, then this 
Article’s descriptive sections may be antidote enough. Once insurers 
understand the nature of the risk, or once local governments are aware of 
the need for insurance, the market may step in to fill this gap. Insurers’ 
sophisticated actuarial expertise might allow them to design a product that 
is priced appropriately, that minimizes moral hazard by keeping local 
governments’ skin in the game, and that produces more efficient regulatory 
incentives.280 But there is also a good chance that this hope is 
simultaneously too arrogant and too modest—arrogant because it supposes 
that markets have so far failed to understand an important form of 
municipal liability, and modest because it then hands the problem off to 
insurers to solve. 
One can hope that pointing out the problem will lead to its solution. 
But in the likely event it does not—in case the combination of moral hazard 
and adverse selection make private insurance difficult to offer—it is 
important to consider public solutions as well, and specifically the extent to 
which states should assume the risk of regulatory takings litigation from 
municipalities.281 This would amount to a kind of subsidy for local 
governments, and it turns out to be an especially effective way for the state 
to encourage particular regulatory initiatives at the local level. It is both 
more targeted and more efficient than currently available tools, including 
even direct grants.282 And it responds to a specific and previously 
unidentified justification for state subsidies in the first place: local 
governments’ risk aversion. 
States currently subsidize many local government activities. In fact, 
direct grants in aid have become the dominant source of local revenue, 
eclipsing even property taxes in many jurisdictions.283 The justifications 
vary in their details depending on the particular regulatory context, but they 
take familiar general forms. First, states subsidize some local activities that 
 
280 For a similar suggestion in the context of corporate insurance, see BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra 
note 42, at 222–23. 
281 This two-tiered private-then-public solution is not unique. See, e.g., French, supra note 150, at 
Part III (proposing both private mechanisms and then state insurance to address existing hole in 
insurance coverage). 
282 See infra text accompanying notes 283–89. 
283 ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 184, at 649. See generally JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW § 3:6 (2d ed. 2015); Christopher K. Odinet, Fairness, Equity, and a Level Playing 
Field: Development Goals for the Resilient City, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 217, 229 (2014). 
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generate positive externalities. Public schools, roads, environmental 
protection, and the like all create benefits that cannot be fully captured by 
individual municipalities. There is, therefore, a real concern that local 
governments will underinvest in those activities.284 State subsidies help to 
realign local incentives with the interests of the state as a whole. 
Second, states subsidize some activities for redistributive reasons. 
There is a conventional account that local governments cannot engage in 
redistributive policies because of the risk of capital flight, and so 
redistribution must occur at the state level.285 And states do this routinely. 
Again, public schools are a leading example, but so are affordable housing 
and other social welfare programs, all of which are often supported by the 
state. Such redistributive policies operate at two different geographical 
levels.286 In the case of education in particular, state funding for local public 
schools serves in many states to redistribute money from wealthier 
municipalities to poorer ones.287 And intra-locally, it serves to protect poor 
and relatively powerless groups from the vicissitudes of local politics, 
which are often dominated by homeowner majorities.288 A community in 
which the most powerful constituents are not invested in public education 
can still not entirely remove funding from its schools. 
Lastly, a state may subsidize regulatory efforts that require more 
expertise than local governments have on their own. Subsidies for land use 
planning, coastal management, and others have a long history and seek to 
combine the benefits of local knowledge with the state’s greater resources 
and expertise.289 
This Article offers a fourth justification for state subsidies: 
overcoming the risk aversion of local governments to takings litigation. 
Risk aversion can result in a local government underregulating or 
underenforcing its regulations when faced with the prospect or threat of 
 
284 See, e.g., Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal 
Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 568–69 (1994); cf. Serkin, supra note 19, at 1693 
(describing desire to use state grants to create positive externalities). 
285 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial 
Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057 (2007) (describing and criticizing conventional account, and 
suggesting that local governments can engage in redistribution). 
286 Serkin & Wellington, supra note 185, at 1668. 
287 See, e.g., Equal Educational Opportunity Act, 16 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4010 (2016) 
(providing for redistribution); see also VT. AGENCY OF EDUC., ACT 60 OF 1997, 
http://education.vermont.gov/laws/1997/act-60/fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/3T26-V7RL] (last updated 
Dec. 4, 2014) (describing Vermont education financing system). 
288 See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1646–52 (discussing FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 39–57). 
289 See, e.g., Dennis E. Gale, Eight State-Sponsored Growth Management Programs: A 
Comparative Analysis, 58 J. AM. PLANNING ASSOC. 425, 432 (1992) (describing different forms of state 
subsidies for local planning initiatives). 
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takings litigation.290 This justification for state intervention also suggests a 
new form of subsidy: insurance against takings litigation. In fact, this is 
likely to be a particularly effective and efficient form of subsidy. 
Imagine a local government considering growth controls aimed at 
curbing sprawl. The new measures might include downzoning some 
undeveloped property, adopting new regulations limiting infrastructure 
expansions, enacting newly restrictive subdivision regulations, and so forth. 
The slate of regulatory changes creates some local costs and benefits, 
including the possibility—indeed, in this case the likelihood—of regulatory 
takings litigation by adversely affected property owners. There is no reason 
in the abstract to expect the local government should come down on one 
side or another, but assume here that a risk neutral government would 
rationally calculate the benefits as greater than the costs, while a risk averse 
government would not and so would not act. 
The state, however, may also have an interest in curbing sprawl. It 
may recognize externalized benefits of preserving open space—both 
aesthetic and ecological—as well as other positive benefits, such as 
reducing driving and so reducing road maintenance costs and energy 
consumption, improving public health outcomes, facilitating public 
transportation, and so forth. State decisionmakers may also benefit from the 
advice of professional planners and policy experts who endorse this kind of 
development even if it remains unpopular among many housing producers 
and consumers. The state, then, may well want to weigh in to encourage 
local adoption of these pro-density local measures. If it wants to place a 
thumb on the scale, how should it do so? 
The traditional tool is to provide direct financial assistance. That can 
take a number of likely forms in this example, such as grants to support 
public transportation that new denser development will require, subsidies 
for conservation initiatives, funding for planning assistance, and the like. 
These can be extremely valuable, and can tip the scales in favor of the local 
government’s action. But their value depends at least in part on the risk 
aversion of the local decisionmakers. 
Faced with the prospect of uninsured regulatory takings liability, a risk 
averse local government will require a greater subsidy from the state to 
offset its risk aversion, and perhaps even a subsidy greater than the value of 
the positive externalities anticipated by the state.291 Alternatively, the state 
 
290 See supra notes 189–97. 
291 Adding some stylized numbers to the example above demonstrates the point. A local 
government might value the benefits of the regulations at $3 million and costs of $3 million (perhaps in 
lost tax revenue or in the private harms to burdened property owners). However, the local government 
also anticipates a 10% chance of $10 million in regulatory takings liability and litigation costs. In this 
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could offer to indemnify local governments for takings litigation—what 
amounts to state insurance for regulatory takings.292 The advantage is that a 
state can, in effect, take advantage of its risk neutrality to subsidize local 
governments by assuming certain risks. The asymmetry in the value of risk 
means that the expected value of the contribution will always be higher to 
the municipality than to the state.293 Every $1 of risk that the state assumes 
will be worth more than $1 to a risk averse local government. A subsidy in 
this form expands the size of the pie. 
There is an additional reason that takings liability might have a 
smaller expected loss for the state than for a local government. The 
willingness of adversely affected property owners to sue may diminish 
once they know that the state will be paying litigation expenses and 
ultimately footing the bill.294 Developer interests often have relatively deep 
pockets, and sometimes even deeper pockets than small local governments. 
By threatening to sue a local government, or actually filing a complaint, a 
developer can often force a local government to capitulate. The state, 
however, is not so easily bullied by the threat of litigation. Developers may 
actually sue less often if they know that the state will be picking up the tab 
because they can anticipate that the state will not capitulate so easily to the 
threat of litigation. Therefore, the risk of takings liability may decrease 
when the state steps in, regardless of relative risk aversion. Indeed, in other 
contexts, states (and the federal government) do provide insurance as a 
form of subsidy to private parties, and it can be a particularly valuable 
one.295 
 
scenario, the expected value of the regulation for the local government is a loss of $1 million. Now 
imagine that there are positive externalities that the state values at $2 million. How much will the state 
have to subsidize the regulatory action in order to induce the local government to act? If the local 
government behaved like a risk neutral rational economic actor, any subsidy over $1 million should 
induce the local government to act. But that changes with risk aversion. The impact of the 10% chance 
of $10 million in takings liability suddenly weighs more heavily than $1 million. Now the state will 
have to pay more, and potentially much more, in order to induce the local government to act. 
292 For a similar suggestion in a very different context, see Comment, Riot Insurance, 77 YALE L. J. 
541, 555 (1968) (proposing that the federal government reinsure states for the costs of urban riots). 
293 Recall that public entities’ risk aversion varies inversely with their size, so states are necessarily 
less risk averse than their municipalities. See supra Section I.A. 
294 In the context of private liability insurance, conventional wisdom is just the opposite: the 
presence of insurance may lead to more claims, including fraudulent ones. See Baker & Siegelman, 
supra note 25, at 181. The difference here is that the municipalities are not judgment proof, and so state 
insurance does not create access to an otherwise unavailable pool of money. See Kent D. Syverud, On 
the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629 (1994) (suggesting that liability insurance 
might create demand by providing access to money that would not otherwise be available). 
295 See, e.g., Chad G. Marzen, Crop Insurance Bad Faith: Protection for America’s Farmers, 
46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 619, 625–29 (2013) (describing federal crop insurance). 
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It is clear enough that the state can provide a valuable subsidy for 
local regulatory actions by assuming to itself some or all of the risks of 
takings litigation and liability. But what form should this take? A state 
could, of course, try to provide an actual insurance product to 
municipalities. In some stylized and idealized world, state insurance could 
be roughly calibrated to the risk aversion of each individual municipal 
government. The more risk averse the government, the greater the 
insurance protection that should be available. An ambitious state could 
attempt to approximate this outcome with coverage that varies in a more or 
less fine-grained way with the size and wealth of individual municipalities. 
If private markets cannot figure out how to provide this product, 
however—the assumption motivating this final discussion—it is difficult to 
see why states would fare much better. A more limited and therefore more 
promising approach does not seek to extend comprehensive regulatory 
takings insurance to all municipalities through complex risk-rating 
stratagems. Instead, it extends indemnification for regulatory takings 
claims as a kind of ad hoc state subsidy to incentivize particular kinds of 
local regulations. 
This proposal could be implemented in many different ways, and there 
are undoubtedly state-level legal challenges that would require further work 
to evaluate. Nevertheless, in broad strokes, the idea is straightforward: 
states should offer takings liability protection in particular predefined 
regulatory settings. In so doing, states could (and already often do) impose 
significant limits on the form and content of local regulatory conduct they 
are willing to insure, thereby minimizing moral hazard concerns and 
exerting state policy pressure.296 To consider just one of innumerable 
examples, a state that wanted to encourage municipalities to plan for sea 
level rise could extend regulatory takings protection, but could also require 
oceanfront communities to include certain elements in their plans (e.g., 
soft-armoring, elevating buildings, infrastructure resiliency) but not others 
(e.g., managed retreat, rolling easements), depending on the state’s policy 
preferences. This is like an insurance company requiring an insured to keep 
working smoke detectors on her property. It may well be that the most 
important and valuable regulatory options are those that come with the 
greatest risk of takings liability. Where—as here—that is true, the state 
need not prohibit those options. That simply increases both the impact and 
the cost of the state’s subsidy. 
 
296 A traditional response to moral hazard is to control the conduct of the insured. See BAKER & 
GRIFFITH, supra note 42, at 66–67. 
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In addition to extending takings insurance in specific contexts, a state 
could also create an even more ad hoc mechanism by which local 
governments petition the state for takings insurance for any regulatory 
action. The state would weigh the merits of the local decision at issue and 
decide whether it is the sort of regulatory action justifying a state subsidy, 
and whether the particular municipality is, in fact, risk averse. If the answer 
to both questions is yes, the state could subsidize the action by agreeing to 
defend regulatory takings claims and pay any resulting liability. 
This could be extremely beneficial in the context of even routine 
development decisions. Imagine a developer with a controversial 
development proposal to which the local government objects. That 
developer may seek any number of regulatory approvals, from upzoning 
the property to subdivision permits. And the local government might be 
reluctant to deny those requests, even if it disapproves of the development, 
for fear of takings litigation. The proposal here would allow the local 
government to petition the state for takings insurance in denying the 
permits. From the state’s perspective, the decision whether to extend that 
protection to the local government will depend entirely on the state’s 
judgment of the value (or harm) of the development. If the state agrees with 
the local assessment that the development will be problematic—perhaps 
worsening regional traffic, burdening infrastructure, and imposing 
environmental costs, among others—the state could subsidize the local 
government’s refusal to allow the development. But, of course, if the state 
perceives the local hostility to development as exclusionary, as 
protectionism for in-place property owners, or as reflecting some other 
problematic motive, the state could deny coverage. 
This proposal clearly raises the possibility of lobbying at the state 
level. In essence, giving the state discretionary power to protect local 
governments from takings liability simply upstreams the politics of 
development decisions to the state. That is true, but it cannot make local 
governments worse off than they are now. If a state bows to developer 
pressure and declines to insure a local government against regulatory 
takings claims, that local government is in precisely the same uninsured 
position it is in today. The discretionary regime proposed here may well 
result in too little protection for local governments—at least relative to the 
goal of incentivizing risk averse decisionmaking—but it is nevertheless a 
substantial improvement. And that should be enough, unless and until 
private insurers find a way to provide actuarially appropriate coverage that 
is more precisely tailored to address local risk aversion and moral hazard. 
Thinking clearly about municipal risk opens up both new justifications 
for, and new forms of, state subsidies. Traditional justifications for state 
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intervention depend on the positive (or negative) externalities of local 
regulatory decisions, or on distributive concerns and problems of equity. 
But risk aversion provides a new reason why local governments may 
forego regulatory actions that would, in fact, make citizens of the state 
better off. In assuming some of that risk—by indemnifying local 
governments for the costs of regulatory takings litigation—states could 
improve local decisionmaking, and provide a targeted but valuable new 
subsidy for local governments. 
CONCLUSION 
The Takings Clause has given rise to important and high-stakes fights 
through the years and has generated a voluminous academic literature 
along the way. Important substantive issues implicate some of the deepest 
questions in the law: the relationship between the government and private 
rights; the distribution of regulatory burdens; and the nature of property. 
Those issues will undoubtedly continue to consume scholarly attention for 
decades to come. But sometimes more granular and practical concerns have 
important lessons for applying the theory on the ground. Municipal risk 
management practices are one such topic. It turns out to be impossible to 
predict the impact of different, contentious takings rules on local regulatory 
incentives without a clearer understanding of how local decisionmakers 
manage municipal risk. When it comes to takings liability, insurance 
mechanisms are surprisingly unavailable. 
Identifying and explaining the inverse condemnation exclusion in 
municipal insurance policies may be enough to trigger change. Private 
insurers may realize that there are opportunities to sell insurance against 
this genuine risk. But in the likely event they do not, because moral hazard 
and other market impediments prove insurmountable, then this could prove 
an opportunity for developing an important new state subsidy. A state 
wishing to incentivize specific municipal land use controls could extend 
insurance against any resulting takings claims instead of, or in addition to, 
more direct grants in aid. And at the very least, recognizing the potential 
impact of risk aversion on local regulatory incentives suggests important 
reasons for caution before exposing municipalities to greater liability. The 
absence of insurance for risk averse governments means that the threat of 
takings liability may result in underregulation and underenforcement of 
important land use and environmental regulations. 
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